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PROTECTING HEALTH INFORMATION IN UTERO:
A RADICAL PROPOSAL
Luke Isaac Haqq*
This Article introduces an underappreciated space in which
protected health information (“PHI”) remains largely unprotected,
a fact that will become only more problematic as clinical medicine
increasingly turns to genomics. The past decade has seen significant
advances in the prevention of birth defects, especially with the
introduction of clinical preconception, prenatal, and neonatal
genomic sequencing.
1
Parental access to the results of embryonic
and fetal clinical sequencing is critical to reproductive autonomy;
results can provide parents with important considerations for
determining whether to seek or avoid conception, as well as for
deciding whether to carry a pregnancy to term.
2
The information
can also prepare parents for the anticipated accommodations
necessary for raising a child affected by complications from
congenital disease.
3
PHI retrieval in the perinatal context,
however—from prenatal testing to state-run newborn screening
programs—raises important concerns, especially in light of
growing reliance on genomic data: Roe v. Wade clearly recognizes
* History of Medicine Program, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities;
haqq0004@umn.edu. I am grateful to Vanessa Laird, Susan Wolf, Gabriella
Manduca, Rachel DiBenedetto, and several editors of the Journal for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts.
1
Luke Haqq, Note, Of Mosquitoes, Adolescents, and Reproductive Rights:
Public Health and Reproductive Risks in a Genomic Age, 101MINN. L. REV. 827,
829–30 (2016) [hereinafter Haqq, Of Mosquitoes, Adolescents, and Reproductive
Rights].
2
Id.
3
Id. (“With such reproductive choice-generating technologies available in
the U.S., parents can now access much of their child’s health information from
sources including routine maternal serum tests during pregnancy visits, specific
tests parents may request be done on the fetus prior to birth or the infant after
birth, and state-run newborn screening programs. This increased access to
information offers parents reproductive choices, helps prevent the existence of
birth defects, and can mitigate their effects if they do occur.”).
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that individuals critically accrue legal rights only upon birth,
4
and
neither federal law nor the law in most states recognizes that
children have any inviolable privacy or autonomy rights to their
PHI.
5
This Article notes potential tensions between protecting PHI
from the embryonic stage onward and the federal reproductive
rights and federal and state statutory conceptions of PHI, but
ultimately emphasizes that protecting PHI in utero adds an
important layer of ex post protection for individuals who are
actually born that need not conflict with a parent’s reproductive
autonomy ex ante. The concerning lack of protection of PHI in utero
is mounting in light of biotechnological advancements in genomic
sequencing generating large quantities of data and as a genomic
healthcare system built on such information becomes a reality. This
Article proposes protecting PHI as early on as embryonic stages by
keeping it within a black box, opaque to unauthorized parties but
transparent in relevant part when authorized parties request
information relevant to decisions like abortion or childcare in
minority. Such a proposal for a greater role of a best-interests
standard in PHI protections merits discussion as a first step in
imagining a landscape that protects PHI throughout an individual’s
lifetime.
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4
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (“[Our historical and
jurisprudential analysis] persuades us that the word ‘person,’ as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.”).
5
Illustratively, in most states, unemancipated minors have no presumptive
rights to refuse a parent’s decision to sequence the child’s genome, and if parents
do request sequencing, “prevailing medical recommendations permit parents to
choose that the results not be returned to the child, with the exception of results
revealing a life-threatening condition.” Haqq, Of Mosquitoes, Adolescents, and
Reproductive Rights, supra note 1, at 830; see, e.g., Laurence B. McCullough et
al., Professionally Responsible Disclosure of Genomic Sequencing Results in
Pediatric Practice, 136 PEDIATRICS e974, e979, e981 (2015); Laine Friedman
Ross et al., Technical Report: Ethical and Policy Issues in Genetic Testing and
Screening of Children, 15 GENETICSMEDICINE 234, 236, 239–40 (2013).
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INTRODUCTION
The past several decades have seen numerous valuable efforts at
the federal and state levels to keep people’s data and health
information private and secure, from the Health Information
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”),
6
the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (“GINA”),
7
and the
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
Act (“HITECH Act”),
8
to a complex net of “federal protections for
[protected] health information” (“PHI”).
9
PHI exists in many
constructed forms—a folder containing one’s medical chart, a
prescription with one’s diagnosis or treatment on it, or a computer
6
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
7
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233,
122 Stat. 881 (2008).
8
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of
2009 (HITECH) of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub
L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 155 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
9
U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., What is PHI?, HHS.GOV,
https://www.hhs.gov/answers/hipaa/what-is-phi/index.html (content last
reviewed Feb. 26, 2013).
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screen providing a return of results.
10
However, PHI importantly and
fundamentally also exists in deconstructed, unanalyzed, bodily, or
physical form—as with an individual’s genome.
11
For the entirety
of this recent history in which PHI has existed as a distinct space of
federal and state regulation, there has been little discussion on the
permissibility of parents accessing genetic information in the
prenatal context, yet newborn screening and prenatal testing and
screening are the major points for parents to access their children’s
PHI. While there are therapeutic reasons for parental access to fetal
information, including screening for disease and disability as part of
the parents’ informed decision on whether to bring the pregnancy to
term, an increasing reliance on genomic sequencing as part of
10
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Your Rights Under HIPAA,
HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-individuals/guidance-materials-for-
consumers/index.html (content last reviewed Feb. 1, 2017).
11
It is worth questioning whether an individual’s genome, left fully
unanalyzed, counts as information at all. On the one hand, it can clearly be
described as information about nucleic acid sequences of adenine, cytosine,
thymine, and guanine (as well as uracil, found in RNA rather than DNA).What’s
a Genome?, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., https://www.genome.gov/About-
Genomics/Introduction-to-Genomics (last updated Oct. 11, 2019). On the other,
it also makes sense not to think of this large quantity of data as “information”
since it is not clear what exactly one would do with this mapping of over three
million base pairs. As one historian of science noted in 2000 (when the Human
Genome Project was imminently about to achieve its primary goal),
A decade ago, many biologists spoke as if sequence information
would, by itself, provide all that was necessary for an
understanding of biological function. [The biochemist Walter
Gilbert would write in this vein,] “Three billion bases of
sequence can be put on a single compact disc (CD), and one
will be able to pull a CD out of one’s pocket and say, ‘Here is a
human being; it’s me!’” Today, almost no one would make such
a provocative claim. [Another possibility is to] liken the human
genome sequence to the Phaestos Disk: an as yet undeciphered
set of glyphs from a Minoan palace . . . [.] With regard to
understanding the A’s, T’s, G’s, and C’s of genomic sequence,
by and large, we are functional illiterates. [There remains a
large] gap between genetic “information” and biological
meaning.
EVELYN FOX KELLER, THE CENTURY OF THE GENE 6, 8 (2000) (quoting Walter
Gilbert, Visions of the Grail, in THE CODE OF CODES 84–85 (Daniel J. Kelves &
Leroy Hood eds., 1992)).
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today’s healthcare system and the actualizing possibility of gene
editing raise issues that will pose new questions with regard to the
extent to which third parties, including parents, should be permitted
to access genomic data at embryonic and fetal stages of
development. This Article adds a layer of discussion to the highly
permissive approach of the U.S. healthcare and legal systems with
respect to disclosing genetic information to parents, and it primes
the legal discussion over the extent to which and the contexts in
which third-party access to certain genetic PHI should be
permissible.
Parents can shape their reproductive decisions with regard to
their concerns about conceiving children with genetic conditions,
diseases, or disorders through an abundance of options that do not
implicate this concern—for instance, carrier testing for conditions
like cystic fibrosis or Tay Sachs disease—as such methods do not
involve accessing fetal or embryonic DNA, just the PHI of the
prospective parents.
12
Sampling fetal DNA, in contrast, is done for
the specific purposes of obtaining PHI that can be individuated from
and is distinct from each parent’s own PHI.
13
Perinatal testing and
12
That is, unlike gene editing or selection in utero, parents in some
populations might be able to garner rough information about risks of the HEXA
gene mutation underlying Tay Sachs, for example, by having their own genomes
sequenced prior to conception. This method of informing reproductive decisions
thus relies fully on the parents’ own PHI. Given that the disease is invariably lethal
by infancy or early childhood, professional recommendations are that couples
considering pregnancy should be offered screening if one of them is in a high-risk
population. See Committee on Genetics, Carrier Screening for Genetic
Conditions: Committee Opinion No. 691, AM. C. OBSTETRICIANS &
GYNECOLOGISTS (Mar. 2017), https://www.acog.org/Clinical-Guidance-and-
Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Genetics/Carrier-Screening-fo
r-Genetic-Conditions?IsMobileSet=false.
13
For example, amniocentesis can extract fetal information and was the
earliest of today’s methods for extracting PHI prenatally. Around the midcentury,
this route made it possible to test for conditions linked to allosomes like
erythroblastosis fetalis, hemophilia, and Duchenne muscular dystrophy. See infra
p. 35 and the discussion therein. Chorionic villus sampling (“CVS”), available
beginning in the 1980s, offered a less invasive prenatal option for detecting fetal
abnormalities earlier in pregnancy by extracting information from the chorion (the
outermost fetal membrane) rather than the amnion (the inner membrane). Options
like preimplantation genetic diagnosis, of course, would become increasingly
available beginning in the 1990s. See ZARKOALFIREVIC ET AL., AMNIOCENTESIS
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screening have grown to become widespread since the 1960s, giving
rise to a default of returning potentially overabundant results of a
fetus or newborn individual’s PHI to parents without the
individual’s prior consent (though, of course, it is not possible to
obtain it in this context).
14
While beneficial in many respects, this
practice has problematically supported a widespread grant of access
for parents, both in terms of the quantity of PHI initially divulged,
and in terms of continued parental access to adolescent children’s
PHI until the child seeks emancipation or pursues sexual activity.
15
This Article emphasizes that current legal protections for PHI
noticeably fail to give individuals adequate protection for their PHI
from conception and birth into adolescence and create controversial
precedent in the rapidly evolving field of biotechnology, a domain
in which privacy continues to prove a mounting concern.
AND CHORIONIC VILLUS SAMPLING FOR PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 6 (2009),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6483702/pdf/CD003252.pdf.
Within the past decade, consumers have also had noninvasive prenatal screening
and testing options relying on genomic sequencing, like the MaterniT 21,
originally offered in 2011. See Early Risk Assessment of Down Syndrome and
Other Conditions, INTEGRATED GENETICS,
https://www.integratedgenetics.com/patients/pregnancy/maternit21plus (last
visited Oct. 26, 2019). Today, the home page for theMaterniT 21 PLUS advertises
that the tool offers “[e]arly risk assessment of Down syndrome and other
conditions.” The company offering the test goes on to advertise,
Did you know that information on your baby’s health can be
found in your own bloodstream? The MaterniT 21 PLUS test
analyzes genetic information that enters your bloodstream from
the placenta. It screens for certain chromosomal abnormalities
that could affect your baby’s health and development—such as
trisomy 21 (Down syndrome) and sex chromosome
aneuploidies (SCAs, abnormal numbers of X or Y
chromosomes)—and can also detect if you’re having a boy or a
girl.
Id.
14
See infra Part V (suggesting a black box approach that releases PHI to
comport with the law but otherwise adds a more nuanced perspective of the
informed consent of the conceptus into the discussion).
15
See infra notes 53–69 and accompanying text (describing the existence of
such rights created through HIPAA, Title X, and Supreme Court precedent on
minor reproductive rights).
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Protecting PHI in utero would involve reforms in the direction
of recognizing that a blood sample containing fetal DNA, for
example, contains the PHI of two genetically distinct individuals,
not one.
16
At the same time, this Article acknowledges that there is
only a potential for unauthorized or unjustified access to embryonic
and fetal PHI if the embryo or fetus is actually brought to term. This
discussion thus proposes reforms that comport with the tenets of Roe
v. Wade but also raise new questions that the future of reproductive
rights will have to confront as genomics and biotechnology continue
to advance. Rather than accepting the present landscape in which the
PHI of children belongs to and is returned to parents from
conception to majority, this Article defends the importance of
protecting PHI throughout an individual’s lifetime, only indirectly
releasing an individual’s PHI to parents if doing so is antecedently
justified with respect to a best-interests-of-the-child or presumed-
consent standard, and only releasing PHI in limited and relevant
doses. This standard could be particularly relevant for shaping
discussions about gene editing options like CRISPR-Cas9 and the
even newer “prime” genomic editor,
17
especially with uses in the
direction of creating designer babies and away from advancing the
best interests of the child.
Part I begins to paint a picture in broad brushstrokes of the
current regulatory regime over PHI in laws like HIPAA and the
16
See infra Parts IV and V. Contra 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018) (defining the
conceptus as PHI of pregnant women, rather than a distinct entity with PHI, by
defining “genetic information” protected by HIPAA to include “[a] fetus carried
by the individual or family member who is a pregnant woman.”).
17
One of its potential advantages over CRISPR-Cas9 is that the newer
“prime” option only needs to break one rather than both strands of DNA. Andrew
V. Anzalone et al., Search-and-Replace Genome Editing Without Double-Strand
Breaks or Donor DNA, NATURE (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-019-1711-4; see also Karen Zusi, New
CRISPR Genome Editing System Offers a Wide Range of Versatility in Human
Cells, SCIENCE DAILY (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/10/191021124511.htm (“The new
prime editing system involves coupling Cas9 to a different protein called reverse
transcriptase. The molecular complex uses one strand of the target DNA site to
‘prime,’ or initiate, the direct writing of edited genetic information into the
genome.”).
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HITECH Act. Part II takes a closer look at the individual privacies
protected in these laws to explain how such regulations governing
PHI thus far have balanced parental and children’s interests, from
the return of results in fetal sequencing and newborn screening
programs to protections for PHI in adolescence. Part III expands the
discussion of keeping the PHI of individuals private to encompass
the proposal of maintaining it private from parents in utero as well,
as a failure to do so would largely eviscerate much of the
instrumental value of regulations seeking to protect PHI later in life.
Part IV contextualizes why this proposal comes as a radical one by
highlighting how it intersects with key elements of the federal
regime of reproductive rights and prenatal tort actions. Finally, Part
V offers solutions and presents the idea of a “black box” framework
that stages return of results as authorized, suggesting some potential
paths forward that could do better in protecting the PHI of
individuals across their lifetimes.
I. DEFINING PROTECTEDHEALTH INFORMATION
The most obvious and direct uses of PHI arise in adulthood, in a
“typical” doctor-patient relationship that does not involve the added
element of intermediating parents making healthcare decisions for
their children as patients.
18
The brief canvassing of PHI law below
makes clear that the adult is the archetypical or standard patient.
19
This focus only on the PHI of adults has led to the marginalization
of persons on either side of adulthood. For example, recent
scholarship has explored the reasons for and against returning a
person’s PHI after the person has deceased and, in particular, when
the decedent’s PHI would be material to the health and reproductive
18
See note 29 and accompanying text (describing how HIPAA’s
“individual” generally only begins to exist in adulthood, with aspects of the
protections that the statute offers even extending beyond the individual’s death).
19
Compare notes 27–29 and accompanying text (describing the meaning of
“individual” under HIPAA), with Section II.A (describing that HIPAA’s default
is that minors are not to be treated as such individuals independently, but rather
that their parents are to be treated as personal representatives responsible for
making the minors’ healthcare decisions).
PROTECTING HEALTH INFORMATION IN UTERO 9
decisions of family members.
20
A considerably smaller body of
literature has raised problems with PHI in adolescence, childhood,
infancy, and in utero.
21
Federal health information privacy law charts the relevant
terrain. Most centrally, this terrain has been defined within HIPAA.
Passed under the Clinton administration in 1996, the HIPAA statute
is broken into five titles: “Healthcare access, portability, and
renewability” (Title I), “Preventing health care fraud and abuse;
administrative simplification; medical liability reform” (Title II),
“Tax-related health provisions” (Title III), “Application and
enforcement of group health plan requirements” (Title IV), and
20
See, e.g., Laura Amendola et al., Patients’ Choices for Return of Exome
Sequencing Results to Relatives in the Event of Their Death, 43 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 476 (2015); Carmen R. Breitkopf et al., Preferences Regarding Return of
Genomic Results to Relatives of Research Participants, Including After
Participant Death: Empirical Results from a Cancer Biobank, 43 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 464 (2015); Susan M. Wolf et al., Returning a Research Participant’s
Genomic Results to Relatives: Analysis and Recommendations, 43 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 440 (2015).
21
See, e.g., DENA DAVIS, GENETIC DILEMMAS: REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY, PARENTALCHOICES,ANDCHILDREN’S FUTURES (2001); Jeffrey R.
Botkin et al., Points to Consider: Ethical, Legal, and Psychosocial Implications
of Genetic Testing in Children and Adolescents, 97 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 6
(2015); Ellen Wright Clayton, How Much Control Do Children and Adolescents
Have over Genomic Testing, Parental Access to Their Results, and Parental
Communication of Those Results to Others?, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 538 (2015);
Dena Davis, Genetic Dilemmas and the Child’s Right to an Open Future, 27
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 7 (1997) (noting the need for a parental autonomy versus
child autonomy paradigm by explaining, in sum, that “most genetic counselors
enter the profession with certain assumptions about health and disability—for
example, that it is preferable to be a hearing person than a deaf person. [Such
assumptions, in turn, can affect how such counselors view couples who want to
create children sharing conditions that parents have, like deafness or dwarfism.]
This ethical challenge benefits little from viewing it as a conflict between
beneficence and autonomy. The challenge is better recast as a conflict between
parental autonomy and the child’s future autonomy.”); Loretta Kopelman, Using
the Best Interests Standard to Decide Whether to Test Children for Untreatable,
Late-Onset Genetic Diseases, 32 J. MED. & PHIL. 375 (2007); Mianna Lotz,
Feinberg, Mills, and the Child’s Right to an Open Future, 37 SOC. PHIL. 537
(2006); Haqq, Of Mosquitoes, Adolescents, and Reproductive Rights, supra note
1, at 837.
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“Revenue offsets” (Title V).
22
Protections concerning the use,
disclosure, privacy, and security of a person’s PHI all fall within
Title II.
23
More specifically, these protections fall within the federal
regulations implementing a component of the statute now known as
the Privacy Rule, one of six rules that Title II directed the
Department of Health and Human Services to promulgate in
furtherance of the title’s purposes of “administrative simplification”
(the others being the Transactions and Code Sets Rule, the Security
Rule, the Unique Identifiers Rule, Breach Notification Rule, and the
Enforcement Rule).
24
The Privacy Rule was opened to public
comment in 1999 and published as a final regulation in 2000,
25
with
some modifications made two years later.
26
22
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
23
See id. at 1937.
24
Id. Tit. II, 110 Stat. at 1991; U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
Combined Regulation Text of All the Rules, HHS.GOV,
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws-regulations/combined
-regulation-text/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2019).
25
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65
Fed. Reg. 82462 (Dec. 28, 2000); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The
HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/privacy/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2019) [hereinafter The
HIPAA Privacy Rule] (describing how the HIPAA Privacy Rule changed over
time).
26
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67
Fed. Reg. 53182 (2002).
The HIPAA Privacy Rule establishes national standards to
protect individuals’ medical records and other personal health
information and applies to health plans, health care
clearinghouses, and those health care providers that conduct
certain health care transactions electronically. The Rule
requires appropriate safeguards to protect the privacy of
personal health information, and sets limits and conditions on
the uses and disclosures that may be made of such information
without patient authorization. The Rule also gives patients
rights over their health information, including rights to examine
and obtain a copy of their health records, and to request
corrections.
The HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 25.
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The Privacy Rule defines PHI as any information held by a
“covered entity” that concerns the health status or the provision or
payment of healthcare services that can be linked to an individual.
27
Under the statute’s language, an “[i]ndividual means the person who
is the subject of the protected health information.”
28
Thus, HIPAA
envisions a specific archetypical individual—its “default person”—
as the type of person the statute protects. This individual only
extends so far. Those who have been dead for more than fifty years,
for example, fall outside the ambit of HIPAA’s protections for
PHI.
29
Though HIPAA offers even this afterlife of protections, it is
not as generous in the opposite direction; the more one falls under
the guardianship of another (i.e., often the further one moves back
into childhood), the fewer protections it accords, eventually offering
none at all. HIPAA’s default person, then, lies between these
extremes—it is neither the individual possessing limited protections
earlier in life, nor the postmortem individual also with limited rights,
but rather exists in the middle.
“Health information” under HIPAA “means any information,
including genetic information, whether oral or recorded” that is
“created or received by a health care provider, health plan, public
health authority, employer, life insurer, school or university, or
health care clearinghouse” (HIPAA’s “covered entities”) and
“relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or
condition of an individual; the provision of health care to an
individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision
of health care to an individual.”
30
“Protected health information”
more specifically means “individually identifiable health
information,” where “individually identifiable” is defined as “a
subset of health information . . . [t]hat identifies the individual” or
“[w]ith respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe the
information can be used to identify the individual.”
31
A covered
entity might permissibly use health information for research, for
27
Public Welfare, 45 CFR § 160.103 (2018).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
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instance, if it has been stripped of all identifiers that could link the
information to a specific person.
A few of HIPAA’s standard protections under the Privacy Rule
are relevant to the regulation of PHI in the perinatal and childhood
contexts. The regulations implementing HIPAA require covered
entities and business associates, when using or disclosing PHI, to
“make reasonable efforts to limit protected health information to the
minimum necessary to accomplish the purpose of the use,
disclosure, or request.”
32
This “minimum necessary” requirement
does not apply to disclosures to the individual who is the subject of
the PHI.
33
In short, the requirement seeks to prevent PHI from being
disclosed beyond what is necessary for a particular function or
purpose. It thus comports well with this Article’s recommendation
to adopt a similar attitude towards PHI at embryonic and fetal stages,
permitting it to be disclosed for authorized purposes but otherwise
keeping it private from third parties.
While they preclude certain uses of PHI, HIPAA regulations
also accord substantial permissions to covered entities and business
associates with respect to allowing public authorities access to PHI
for a variety of reasons. These permissions include disclosures to
public authorities “for the purpose of preventing or controlling
disease, injury, or disability, including, but not limited to, the
reporting of disease, injury, vital events such as birth or death, and
the conduct of public health surveillance, public health
investigations, and public health interventions,”
34
as well as
disclosures to public authorities investigating child abuse and
neglect,
35
instances in which the persons are subject to the
jurisdiction of the Food and Drug Administration,
36
and those in
which the person poses a risk of spreading a communicable
disease.
37
This permission to deviate from the minimum-necessary
requirement therefore countenances several circumstances in which
32
Public Welfare, 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b) (2018).
33
§ 164.502(b)(2).
34
§ 164.512(b)(1)(i).
35
§ 164.512(b)(1)(ii).
36
§ 164.512(b)(1)(iii).
37
§ 164.512(b)(1)(iv).
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public authorities can access PHI without needing consent from the
individual who is the subject of that PHI.
38
A similar regime of broad disclosure without a consent
requirement was carried over into the HITECH Act of 2009, which
strengthened many of HIPAA’s protections.
39
To this end, the
HITECH Act offers incentives and eventual penalties for non-
implementation to institutions to adopt systems of electronic health
records for meaningful uses.
40
Under the Act, one permissible
meaningful use is articulated as one to “improve population and
public health.”
41
Despite the requirement that data be sufficiently
anonymized, this regime is especially concerning because of the
enormous potential in harnessing large quantities of aggregated
health information for the purposes of helping fuel a genomic
healthcare system running on analysis of big data.
42
Indeed, on the
one hand, the more that PHI is stripped of all identifying
information, the less use it has for public health authorities—for
instance, allowing zip codes to remain attached to the PHI could
facilitate research and prevent risks endemic to populations in
38
See notes 32–37 and the sources therein.
39
Howard Burde, The HITECH ACT—An Overview, 13 AM. MED. ASS’N J.
ETHICS 172, 173 (2011).
40
Id. at 174.
41
Public Health and Promoting Interoperability Programs (Formerly,
Known as Electronic Health Records Meaningful Use): Introduction, CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/ehrmeaningfuluse/introduction.html (content last reviewed
Sept. 9, 2019); see Public Health, 42 C.F.R. § 495.40 (2011); Public Health and
Promoting Interoperability Programs (Formerly, Known as Electronic Health
Records Meaningful Use): Program Description and History, CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/ehrmeaningfuluse/index.html (last reviewed Oct. 9, 2019).
42
In part, the production of this data has been fueled by a “dramatic drop” in
the cost of sequencing over the past few years. Rita Rubin, Precision Medicine:
The Future or Simply Politics?, 313 JAMA 1089, 1089 (2015). Such
developments, in turn, were catalysts encouraging President Obama to allocate
federal funds to precision healthcare. Remarks by the President in the State of the
Union Address, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 20, 2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-pres
ident-state-union-address-January-20-2015.
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particular geographic locations.
43
On the other, researchers now
claim that it is already feasible to locate a person based only on a zip
code data point and an otherwise deidentified genome.
44
For the present purposes, the possibility that federal laws like the
HITECH Act and HIPAA
45
are ill-equipped for horizons of
personalized medicine and genomic healthcare is of secondary
importance. The above provides a glimpse of what PHI is:
information possessed by a covered entity about an identifiable
individual’s healthcare payment, services, or health status. The
above also gives a view of what some of the protections of this
information offer—including rights that such data will not be
disclosed to third parties without the patient’s consent, unless it is
sufficiently deidentified.
46
Disclosure to third parties, however, is
one of the central issues implicated by the lack of protections that
laws like the HITECH Act and HIPAA
47
provide today to children
regarding their own PHI being accessed by parents.
43
E.g., Khaled El Emam, Methods for the De-identification of Electronic
Health Records for Genomic Research, 3 GENOMEMED. 1, 2 (2011) (identifying
“geographic indicators” as a method that “can be used to probabilistically identify
an individual” using otherwise deidentified information); Daniel S. W. Tan et al.,
Cancer Genomics: Diversity and Disparity Across Ethnicity and Geography, 34
J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 91, 98 (2016); Tanya Yatsunenko et al., Human Gut
Microbiome Viewed Across Age and Geography, 486 NATURE 222, 222 (2012).
44
See LATANYA SWEENY ET AL., IDENTIFYING PARTICIPANTS IN THE
PERSONAL GENOME PROJECT BY NAME 2–4 (2013),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1304.7605.pdf.
45
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of
2009 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub L. No. 111-
5, 123 Stat. 155 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996).
46
Public Welfare, 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018) (“Individually identifiable
information is information that is a subset of health information.”); see also note
31 and accompanying text (explaining how health information is protected by
HIPAA when it is individually identifiable, that is, identifying a particular
individual).
47
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of
2009, 123 Stat. 155; Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
110 Stat. 1936.
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II. THERIGHTS OFCHILDREN TO THEIROWN PHI: THECURRENT
LANDSCAPE
Despite the background presumption in federal laws like HIPAA
that people have considerably robust protections for their PHI once
adults, and then even extending decades after death,
48
this Part
explains how there are far fewer protections available for the PHI of
minor children. First, Section II.A works backwards from
adolescence, the period during which the most robust protections for
PHI are available for minors. Second, Section II.B places these
limited protections for PHI during minority—which appear to
extend primarily to minors who become emancipated, who are
sexually active, or who otherwise reveal another heightened
category of PHI—in contrast with the default position that has been
reflected by state-run newborn screening programs for over half a
century, namely, of returning results of the child’s PHI to parents,
presuming that they are the owners or caretakers of their child’s
PHI.
49
A. Minor Rights to PHI and the Requirement of
Emancipation
Parental rights under HIPAA are covered in the section on
“personal representatives.”
50
That section provides that “[i]f under
applicable law a person has authority to act on behalf of . . . an
unemancipated minor in making decisions related to health care, a
covered entity must treat such person as a personal representative.”
51
The default position in HIPAA’s implementing regulations
therefore is that treating parents as the personal representatives of
their children in healthcare decisions—which inevitably involves
48
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 110 Stat.
1936.
49
See infra Part IV. While it denies that parents are owners of this PHI, this
Article supports giving parents access to a limited range of the child’s PHI when
it is based on ideal informed consent, as would be the case with several aspects of
PHI revealed in newborn screening results.
50
§164.502(g)(1).
51
§ 164.502(g)(2) (emphasis added).
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disclosing the child’s PHI to parents so that they can make those
decisions—is mandatory, not permissive.
52
At the same time, HIPAA states that, with regard to PHI
pertaining to a healthcare service, parents “may” not be
representatives when “minor[s] may lawfully obtain such health
care service[s] without the consent of a parent.”
53
In other words,
HIPAA requires that parents be treated as representatives who act
on behalf of their child in making healthcare decisions, but the
statute recognizes that this default might be overridden if there is
judicial precedent or other applicable federal or state law giving the
minor rights to access healthcare without parental involvement. This
provision is a key wedge in HIPAA that permits minor informational
privacy rights to be encompassed by the statute. It both speaks to the
statute’s overarching authority—namely, in defining what PHI is
and the extent to which it is protected, but also speaks to its aim of
comporting with state and other federal laws.
54
Other applicable federal and state laws can carve out
considerable exceptions (i.e., permitting direct minor access rather
than the default of treating parents as representatives), especially by
way of granting minors reproductive rights. For example, covered
entities and business associates could not require parents to be
decisionmakers if this violated Supreme Court precedent granting
unemancipated minors the right to access contraception and abortion
privately from parents. The Court has recognized the right of minors
to access contraception since 1977, including their right to access it
without parental consent.
55
It had also found a state law
unconstitutional that required all minors to obtain parental consent
prior to obtaining an abortion a year earlier,
56
indirectly affirming
this line of precedent again in a 1979 decision upholding a law
facially including a parental consent requirement, so long as the law
simultaneously contained provisions offering minors judicial bypass
52
Id.
53
§ 164.502(g)(3)(i)(B).
54
Id. (permitting deviation from the default of treating parents as
representatives where the “minor[s] may lawfully obtain such health care
service[s] without the consent of a parent”).
55
Carey v. Population Servs., 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977).
56
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 56, 72 (1976).
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as an option in lieu of parental consent.
57
Such recognitions of minor
rights to privacy comported with one function of the contraception
and abortion rights generally: protecting privacy in the doctor-
patient relationship.
58
Title X of the Public Health and Safety Act (“Title X”), the only
source of federal funding dedicated exclusively to family
planning,
59
is another (albeit limited) source of reproductive rights
for minors, one which does not contain as strong a parental default
as HIPAA.
60
Rather, recipients of Title X funds are required to
57
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979).
58
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (“Whatever
constitutional status the doctor-patient relation may have as a general matter, in
the present context, it is derivative of the woman’s position,” a position which
includes a right to privacy). At the same time, the Court refrained from granting
minors the same scope of abortion right as adults, stressing their “inability to make
critical decisions in an informed and mature manner and the importance of the
parental role in child rearing.” Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634.
59
Title X, NAT’L FAM. PLAN. & REPROD. HEALTH ASS’N (2019),
https://www.nationalfamilyplanning.org/title_x. As I have emphasized
elsewhere, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (“EMTALA”) is
another source of limited protections for services related to family planning—
namely, labor and delivery services, and only when labor presents hospital
personnel with an “emergency medical condition.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2018);
Public Welfare, 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(b)(1) (2018); Luke Haqq, Expanding
Reproductive Rights to Indigent Noncitizens: A Prioritarian View, 11 ASIA PAC.
J. HEALTH&ETHICS 139, 156 (2018) [hereinafter Haqq, Expanding Reproductive
Rights to Indigent Noncitizens]; see alsoOwens v. Nacogdoches Cty. Hosp. Dist.,
741 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (finding a hospital liable for violating
the state’s Anti-Dumping Act after instructing a woman in labor to drive to
another hospital but failing to provide her with the transportation as stipulated in
the transfer requirement of the statute).
60
Compare ANGELIA NAPILI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33644, TITLE X
(PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ACT) FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAM 24 (2017) (“Title
X projects may not require written consent of parents or guardians for the
provision of services to minors.”), with U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/privacy/laws-regulations/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2019)
(“In most cases, parents are the personal representatives for the minor children.”).
“The federal government provides grants for family planning services through the
Family Planning Program, Title X of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C.
§§300 to 300a-6). Enacted in 1970, it is the only domestic federal program
devoted solely to family planning and related preventive health services. In 2015,
Title X-funded clinics served 4.0 million clients.” NAPILI, supra note 60. Given
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certify that they “encourage family participation” in instances where
minors request family planning services.
61
In most cases, obviously
the most relevant family participation would be that of parents, but
this language is still permissive rather than mandatory in that
encouraging family participation is not a requirement that family
participate. Indeed, regulations implementing the statute explicitly
direct Title X grantees to maintain strict confidentiality of the
information of minors who access reproductive services.
62
Institutions offering such services and drawing on Title X funds thus
balance a requirement to certify that they encourage family
participation on the one hand
63
against a concomitant obligation to
protect the minor’s PHI on the other. This balancing can generally
be justified by reference to Title X’s standard that family
participation need only be encouraged “to the extent practical,”
64
terms granting minors more direct control over accessing clinical
services than the parental default of HIPAA.
65
Given Title X’s aim
of serving low-income families, minors requesting family planning
services are to be “considered on the basis of their own resources,”
rather than including the income of parents.
66
Minors seeking to access options like contraception and abortion
therefore can find ample refuge in their protected federal
reproductive rights and can obtain protection of their PHI if it relates
to their desire to use family planning services. Of course, a minor
would have to be sexually active—or at least broach the subject of
sexual activity or family planning during a doctor’s visit—to access
these protections for PHI, an incentive that federal PHI protections
thus give in favor of protecting teenagers engaged in sexual
Title X’s aim of serving low-income families, minors requesting family planning
services are to be “considered on the basis of their own resources,” rather than
including the income of parents. Public Welfare, 42 C.F.R. § 59.2 (2018).
61
115 Pub. L. 31, 131 Stat. 538 (2019). “Grantees continued to be required
to certify that they encourage ‘family participation’ when minors seek family
planning services and to certify that they counsel minors on how to resist
attempted coercion into sexual activity.” NAPILI, supra note 60, at 1.
62
Public Welfare, 42 C.F.R. § 59.11 (2018).
63
H.R. 6157, 115th Div. B, § 207 (2017–2018).
64
42 U.S.C. 300(a) (2017).
65
See supra notes 50–54 and the sources therein.
66
Public Welfare, 42 C.F.R. § 59.2 (2018).
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activity.
67
If the services that a minor wishes to access are merely
general healthcare services (and not those related to heightened
categories of PHI), in other words, the entrenched default is that the
minor’s PHI can be disclosed to parents, whereas if the services
pertain to reproductive rights, then federal and state protections are
triggered to preserve the confidentiality of the minor’s PHI.
68
In
addition to federal law on reproductive rights, all states have statutes
permitting minors access to certain clinical services without parental
permission, such as services related to sexual activity, drug and
alcohol abuse, and mental health.
69
67
Such PHI might, for example, involve reproductive health (e.g., sexually
transmitted diseases, pap smear results), or it might pertain to what can be
distinguished as information of reproductive significance—that is, information
that guides and informs reproductive autonomy (e.g., carrier screening and
prenatal testing results, pregnancy warnings on pharmaceuticals, signage posted
at grocery stores or airports about possible teratogenic risks to pregnancies in the
environment, etc.). Cf. Haqq, Of Mosquitoes, Adolescents, and Reproductive
Rights, supra note 1, at 829 n.12 (emphasizing the difference between
reproductive health information and information of reproductive significance).
68
That is, doctors are to follow HIPAA and treat parents as representatives
as the default, unless the minor can otherwise obtain such services “lawfully.”
Public Welfare, 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(3)(i)(B). A minor requesting services
related to abortion, for example, can lawfully obtain those services without
parental involvement according to Supreme Court precedent. Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 75 (1976).
69
See generally ABIGAIL ENGLISH ET AL., STATEMINOR CONSENT LAWS: A
SUMMARY (2010), https://www.freelists.org/archives/hilac/02-2014/pdftRo8tw8
9mb.pdf (discussing the enactment of statutes in each state for minors to obtain
certain services without a parent’s consent). See also Abigail English, Health
Care for Adolescents: Ensuring Access, Protecting Privacy, 39 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 253, 264 (2005) (describing adolescents as having “experienced increased
opportunities to receive confidential health care services, particularly for concerns
related to sexual activity, pregnancy, sexually transmitted infections (STIs), HIV,
substance abuse, and mental health”). Advisory opinions by the American
Medical Association (“AMA”) also elaborate on a physician’s duty in such
respect under the Code of Ethics, stating that “[p]hysicians . . . have a
responsibility to protect the confidentiality of minor patients, within certain
limits.” Confidential Health Care for Minors, AM. MED. ASS’N,
https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/confidential-health-care-minors
(last visited Oct. 26, 2019). Those limits arise in situations where unemancipated
minors “request[] confidential care and the law does not grant the minor decision-
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Beyond a minor’s potential interests in keeping some PHI
private from parents by keeping it strictly within the minor’s own
doctor-patient relationship, minors also have legitimate interests in
ensuring parents do not disclose the child’s PHI to others, including
instances of disclosures to third parties, even on parents’ social
media accounts without the minor’s consent (a form of what has
been called “sharenting”).
70
Granted, if minors obtained clinical
services without notifying parents, some of their PHI might
nevertheless be conveyed to parents if billing for the service is
processed through their insurance policy; the AMA’s guideline is
that physicians are required to warn minors of such a possibility if
they request confidential care, including clinical encounters that the
law does not explicitly recognize as appropriate for minor decision-
making.
71
If parents did obtain and disclose such information,
children might try to seek recourse in various tort claims.
72
making authority,” in which case the physician must provide information to the
minor, including a statement through which the physician will “encourage the
minor patient to involve his or her parents and offer to facilitate conversation
between the patient and the parents . . . . In some jurisdictions, the law permits
minors who are not emancipated to request and receive confidential services
relating to contraception, or to pregnancy testing, prenatal care, and delivery
services.” The AMAgoes on to explain that, “[s]imilarly, jurisdictions may permit
unemancipated minors to request and receive confidential care to prevent,
diagnose, or treat sexually transmitted disease, substance use disorders, or mental
illness.” Id.
70
E.g., Anya Kamenetz, The Problem with ‘Sharenting’, N.Y. TIMES (June
5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/opinion/children-internet-
privacy.html; Gabriel Snyder, One Day, All of This Will Be Embarrassing, THE
ATLANTIC (June 11, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2019/06/
sharenting-its-way-becoming-old-fashioned/591361/.
71
Confidential Health Care for Minors, supra note 69.
72
An unauthorized, nonconsensual disclosure of an individual’s PHI to
parents is not something that can be undone, short of them forgetting the
information. Thus, for example, liability from an invasion of privacy tort might
arise sometime well into the child’s adulthood, after, say, parents disclose certain
PHI that the individual finds embarrassing. If parents qua guardians of their
children’s PHI were treated as having informational stewardship obligations in a
similar manner as “covered entities” under HIPAA, such parental obligations not
to disclose PHI might also last as long as half a century after their child has died.
Public Welfare, 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
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Penultimately, aside from the access and privacy concerns
canvassed above, increasing reliance on genetic and genomic
information also presses issues regarding a minor’s right to refuse
such testing.
73
On this front, with respect to genomic and genetic
testing, “unemancipated minors have virtually no access to the
courts to enjoin parental behavior.”
74
In part, this is because child
protection agencies would be unlikely to intervene to uphold a
minor’s refusal to be tested because, given that it is unlikely to
impose a risk of serious harm to the child, such non-invasive testing
might not qualify as neglect or abuse that is sufficiently severe to
necessitate enjoining parental behavior. Still, physicians have
discretion to refuse to perform procedures they deem “morally
illicit,”
75
which could plausibly include obtaining samples for
sequencing from a teenager who expressly objects to this being
done. Indeed, professional ethical standards hold that clinicians
should not perform testing on minors who object if they are “older
school-age children.”
76
Finally, professional pediatric recommendations support return
of genomic results to adolescent individuals.
77
The American
Academy of Pediatricians and American College of Medical
Genetics (“ACMG”) jointly issued a policy statement in 2013
supporting the initiation of pediatric genomic testing if parents know
of a family history of mutations but otherwise not favoring pre-
symptomatic genomic screening of minors.
78
In a separate policy
statement that year, the ACMG recommended that, if parents obtain
pediatric whole genome or exome sequencing for a targeted
73
In the words of the U.S. National Library of Medicine, “Genetic testing is
voluntary. Because testing has benefits as well as limitations and risks, the
decision about whether to be tested is a personal and complex one.” What is
Genetic Testing?, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MEDICINE (Oct. 15, 2019),
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/testing/genetictesting.
74
Clayton, supra note 21, at 539.
75
Susan T. Rouse, Professional Autonomy in Medicine: Defending the Right
of Conscience in Health Care Beyond the Right to Religious Freedom, 79
LINACREQ. 155, 156 (2012).
76
Arthur Kohrman et al., Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and
Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314, 316 (1995).
77
Haqq, Of Mosquitoes, Adolescents, and Reproductive Rights, supra note
1, at 842–44.
78
Ross et al., supra note 5, at 234.
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purpose, incidental findings should be returned to parents if they
reveal conditions in the child that are life-threatening unless
ameliorated in childhood.
79
The ACMG initially recommended that
parents should not be permitted to opt out from the analysis of
incidental findings but released a policy update that reversed on that
point in 2014,
80
after receiving criticism for the initial
recommendation.
81
The National Institute of Health’s Clinical Sequencing
Exploratory Research Pediatric Working Group (“CSER-PWG”)
similarly encourages returning results of PHI from genomic
sequencing to minors.
82
For example, the working group provides
recommendations directed at the return of results that have
reproductive significance for minor subjects.
83
It articulates that
pediatricians have a “prima facie, autonomy-based ethical
obligation to provide adolescent patients, ideally before they
become sexually active, with reproductive risk assessment
results.”
84
Minors, CSER-PWG goes on, should be permitted “to
refuse to learn or to act on the results of reproductive risk
assessment[s].”
85
Similar in nature to the ACMG’s 2014 update
allowing parents to opt out of analysis of incidental findings,
however, the CSER-PWG maintains that parents do not violate a
prima facie ethical obligation to their child by choosing not to tell
the child of non-life-threatening incidental findings.
86
In sum, the clearest route to having rights to one’s PHI as a
minor is to become emancipated, which triggers state law
79
Robert C. Green et al., ACMG Recommendations for Reporting of
Incidental Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing, 15 GENETICS
MEDICINE 565, 568 (2013).
80
Am. Coll. of Med. Genetics & Genomics, ACMG Updates
Recommendations on “Opt Out” for Genomic Sequencing Return of Results,
CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 1, 2014, 10:00 AM ET),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/acmg-updates-recommendation-on-
opt-out-for-genome-sequencing-return-of-results-253369641.html.
81
Wylie Burke et al., Recommendations for Returning Genomic Incidental
Findings? We Need to Talk!, 15 GENETICSMEDICINE 854, 857 (2013).
82
McCullough et al., supra note 5, at e978.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at e979.
86
Id.
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protections according them autonomy and confidentiality in medical
treatment and eliminates the status of parents as personal
representatives for the minor’s healthcare decisions.
87
Alternatively
and more indirectly, minors can seek to extend their protected state
or federal reproductive rights to the privacy of the doctor-patient
relationship and any PHI within that relationship, though this
primarily extends protection to minors for their PHI only if they
purport to be engaged in or interested in sexual activity or raise
certain other heightened categories of PHI. As shown above, these
limited routes to direct access by minors have some support in
federal laws like HIPAA (and even the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Labor Act (“EMTALA”)),
88
in state laws
recognizing heightened protections for certain categories of PHI,
and in the recommendations of national organizations within
professional medicine. If the minor is neither emancipated nor
asserting a reproductive right or otherwise raising a heightened
category, then the default view, made explicit in HIPAA, is that
87
See Ann McNary, Consent to Treatment of Minors, 11 INNOVATIONS IN
CLINICALNEUROSCIENCE 43, 44 (2014) (providing examples of court ordered and
situational emancipation and explaining that, “[w]hile the law has traditionally
considered minors to be incompetent to give consent for medical treatment, most
states now have statutes that give minors the right to consent to treatment in
specific situations,” the most straightforward of which is emancipation).
88
For instance, suppose the clinical encounter involves a pregnant teenager
who has run away from home and has gone into labor within the meaning of
EMTALA when she presents herself at the hospital. The EMTALA statute
(passed as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(“COBRA”) of 1985 to address the problematic phenomenon of hospitals engaged
in “patient dumping”), as a first matter, ought to provide her with the initial foot
in the door, guaranteeing that she will receive treatment and care in the form of
labor and delivery services. EMTALA requires hospitals and clinics to do this if
they are capable, only releasing her after they have “stabilized” her within the
meaning of the statute, or alternatively transferring her if they are incapable of
providing the care themselves. As a second matter, once in the healthcare system
via EMTALA, it would seem she would be entitled to any of the aforementioned
federal, state, and professional protections for her PHI. See Haqq, Expanding
Reproductive Rights to Indigent Noncitizens, supra note 59 (discussing available
venues for indigent noncitizens to obtain protections for their reproductive
interests).
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parents have wide latitude in accessing their child’s PHI without the
child’s consent.
89
B. PHI in Newborn Screening and the Threat of Genomics
On the one hand, federal guidance on Title X has noticed that
“multiple professional medical associations have emphasized the
importance of providing confidential services to adolescents,” since
a failure to protect confidentiality can dissuade them from using
those services.
90
On the other, such a recommendation still operates
within a landscape that gives parents nearly complete control over
the healthcare of their children before adolescence.
91
Such parental
control might be limited to some extent if it poses an imminent threat
to the child’s health.
92
The return of results in newborn screening
programs constitutes one of the more widespread examples of
sharing expansive PHI data in practice, which raises concerns as
89
See notes 50–52 and accompanying text (describing HIPAA’s mandatory
language providing that parents must be treated as personal representatives of
their children).
90
Loretta Gavin et al., Providing Quality Family Planning Services:
Recommendations of CDC and the U.S. Department of Population Affairs, 63
MORTALITY&MORBIDITYWKLY. REP. 1, 13 (2014).
91
See supra Section II.A; see also People v. Rippberger, 283 Cal. Rptr. 111,
113, 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (discussing Christian Science parents convicted of
felony child endangerment); Richard J. Brenneman, Nestling’s Faltering Flight:
The Short Life and Death of Seth Ian Glaser, in DEADLY BLESSINGS: FAITH
HEALING ON TRIAL (1990) (death of child from bacterial meningitis, born to
Christian Science parents). But see Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609,
609, 614. 517 (Mass. 1993) (involving an involuntary manslaughter claim against
parents who relied on prayer to heal their child who died of peritonitis).
92
See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (recognizing a
governmental authority to regulate parents over their treatment of their own
children if it is in the best interests of the child). The Supreme Court has not ruled
on the constitutionality of state regulations that contravene parental wishes to
pursue medical treatment in the best interests of the child. The majority of states
provide exemptions from child neglect laws for parents who rely on “faith
healing,” though more than half of these states have judicial bypass options that
permit judges to compel medical treatment against parental wishes when the
child’s life is endangered. See supra note 91 and the sources therein.
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such programs envisage the use of newborn genomic sequencing in
the near future.
93
Newborn screening programs first arose in the 1960s to identify
infants born with phenylketonuria (“PKU”), after Robert Guthrie’s
development of an assay that measured phenylalanine levels using
the blood from a heel prick placed onto filter paper, also known as
“Guthrie cards.”
94
Given their efficacy in staving off the highly
debilitating effects of congenital diseases like PKU through early
detection and treatment, these programs quickly spread across the
U.S. and abroad and are now mandated by law in all fifty states and
the District of Columbia.
95
Newborn screening expanded beyond
solely PKU testing to include a panel of numerous congenital
diseases and disorders, and today such screenings identify thousands
of children annually with metabolic, endocrine, hematologic, or
functional disorders.
96
If clinically significant results arise, state
laboratories notify clinicians, who relay the information to parents
to enable them to seek diagnostic confirmation and treatment
options.
97
In this context of newborn screening, a panoply of the child’s
PHI is returned to parents, with some states requiring parents to opt
in regarding the analysis of incidental findings and others giving
them the choice to opt out.
98
The list of conditions on screening
93
Michelle Huckaby Lewis & Aaron J. Goldenberg, Return of Results from
Research Using Newborn Screening Dried Blood Samples, 43 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 559, 560 (2015).
94
Robert Guthrie &Ada Susi, A Simple Phenylalanine Method for Detecting
Phenylketonuria in Large Populations of Newborn Infants, 32 PEDIATRICS 338,
338 (1963).
95
E.g., Jeffrey Brosco & Diane B. Paul, The Political History of PKU:
Reflections on 50 Years of Newborn Screening, 132 PEDIATRICS 987, 987 (2013)
(“In the early 1960s, parents of children with intellectual disability began to
advocate for state laws to test all newborns in the United States, and the first state
laws for universal newborn screening (NBS) were implemented 50 years ago. By
1965, 32 American states had enacted screening laws, all but 5 making the test
compulsory. By the mid-1970s, NBS for PKU had become routine in nearly every
industrialized nation, and had even extended to many poorer countries.”).
96
Lewis & Goldenberg, supra note 93, at 560.
97
Id.
98
E.g., Michelle Huckaby Lewis et al., State Laws Regarding the Retention
and Use of Residual Newborn Screening Blood Samples, 127 PEDIATRICS 703,
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panels varies state to state, but their inclusion is based on factors
such as the severity of the condition detected and the clinical validity
of the results.
99
It is important to reiterate that the vast majority of
the time, parental access to children’s PHI through newborn
screening is easily justified with reference to the best interests of the
child.
100
Most often, the motivation for parents who seek to have
their children’s PHI disclosed to them is in furtherance of the
laudable pursuit of doing their best to ensure the child’s health and
wellbeing by preparing themselves with the knowledge and
resources necessary to care for and nurture their child’s
development.
101
What is more, as PKU exemplifies, parents can be
faced with the need to make healthcare decisions on behalf of their
children within a relatively short span of time, and certainly well
before it could be possible to seek and receive the affected child’s
consent.
102
707 tbl. 1 (2011) (providing a national overview on return of results in state
newborn screening programs); Lewis &Goldenberg, supra note 93, at 564 (“Most
states allow parents to opt-out of mandatory screening, but few states require that
parents be informed of their option to refuse.”).
99
Lewis & Goldenberg, supra note 93, at 566.
100
In the U.S., the best-interests standard emerged in the twentieth century
within broader conceptualizations of the parens patriae role of the state. In the
early twentieth century this concept could be found in the “tender years” doctrine
in divorce law (which gave mothers greater custody rights for young children).
By the latter half of the twentieth century, the tender years doctrine was displaced
in most states by the language of the best-interests standard, which could be found
applying in a range of contexts—from child protection, children born out of
marriage, and divorce and custody, to wills and trusts, grandparent visitation
rights, and immigration law. Globally, the best-interests standard into the twenty-
first century has been articulated most centrally in the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child, which the U.S. has conspicuously never ratified. See G.A.
Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989).
101
E.g.,What Happens If A Newborn Screening Test Comes Back Positive?,
U.S. NAT’L LIB. MEDICINE, https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/newbornscreening/nb
spositive (last reviewed July 2015) (advising, if parents receive positive results
from screening, to seek further testing to ascertain whether treatment or
management options, like a special diet, are necessary).
102
Id. (emphasizing the role of newborn screening results—which are
returned “[w]ithin 2 to 3 weeks”—in enabling “quick follow-up” so that any
necessary treatments can be initiated “very soon after birth” (emphasis added)).
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These reasonable justifications for accessing a child’s PHI
without consent are important to bear in mind, but they should not
be taken as a dispositive reason against reforms that strengthen the
minimum-necessary principle of PHI disclosure. To the contrary,
given the effectiveness of early treatment, the ability of parents to
access PHI through newborn screening results could be justified
with respect to notions of what the child would reasonably be
presumed to consent to, an equivalent standard to one reflecting the
best interests of the child.
103
The point is that such accessing of PHI
without the subject’s consent is something that demands
justification,
104
a justification that is perhaps implied in screening
for serious diseases or disorders (it might be implied, for instance,
as to congenital diseases like Tay Sachs, PKU, congenital rubella,
and cystic fibrosis, some of the central congenital conditions that
had motivated structural changes to state and federal laws beginning
in the 1960s).
105
However, justification based on implied consent
would become increasingly difficult to maintain if newborn
screening relies less on targeted and more on full genomic
sequencing, as this would involve returning far more PHI data than
would be necessary for parents to make healthcare decisions about
therapy or treatment on behalf of their child.
103
See, e.g., Aaron J. Goldberg & Richard R. Sharp, The Ethical Hazards
and Programmatic Challenges of Genomic Newborn Screening, 307 JAMA 461
(2012); Muin J. Khoury et al., Population Screening in the Age of Genomic
Medicine, 348 NEW ENGL. J. MEDICINE 50 (2003); Bartha M. Knoppers et al.,
Return of Genetic Testing Results in the Era of Whole-Genome Sequencing, 16
NATURE REVS. GENETICS 553 (2015); Bartha M. Knoppers et al.,Whole Genome
Sequencing in Newborn Screening Programs, 6 SCI. & TRANSLATIONAL MED.
229 (2014).
104
There are substantial discussions about the ethics of the return of results
stage, especially with respect to the treatment of “incidental findings.” See, e.g.,
Burke et al., supra note 81; Mildred K. Cho, Understanding Incidental Findings
in the Context of Genetics and Genomics, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 280 (2008);
Robert C. Green et al., supra note 79; Susan M. Wolf et al.,Managing Incidental
Findings and Research Results in Genomic Research Involving Biobanks and
Archived Data Sets, 14 GENETICS MEDICINE 361 (2012); Susan M. Wolf,
Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research: Analysis and
Recommendations, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 219 (2008); Susan M. Wolf et al.,
Patient Autonomy and Incidental Findings in Clinical Genomics, 340 SCI. 1049
(2013).
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See infra notes 130–138 and accompanying text.
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For similar reasons, the question of parental access to the
panoply of results returned from genetic sequencing in the newborn
and fetal contexts suggests ethical questions that may eventually
arise if embryonic gene editing joins the armory of acceptable
clinical tools.
106
As with too broad a return of results, so also might
it be difficult to justify PHI access for the purpose of selective
creation of desired types of children (i.e., “designer babies”) from a
best-interests standard. Justification for unnecessarily broad return
of results may also be difficult because of the role of that such
selection is playing in leading to the obsolescence of people with
certain conditions from the human population.
107
The possibility of
106
It is worth noting that the goal of protecting PHI at embryonic and fetal
stages does not fall prey to a challenge posed by the reality that there are many
repositories storing numerous frozen embryos. If PHI were protected at the
embryonic stage even prior to implantation, the reason for doing so does not rest
on ascribing moral status or personhood to embryos categorically. Rather, again,
accessing PHI becomes problematic in the scenario in which an embryo is brought
to term. Still, this can legitimately mean limiting access ex ante to the PHI of all
embryos created (unless there is a therapeutic, best-interests reason to divulge it),
even ones that will otherwise be discarded or frozen and never used. Even in the
context of in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) and preimplantation genetic diagnosis
(“PGD”), parents could exercise the ability to discard unhealthy embryos without
knowing everything about them; PHI could be protected in such an example even
where the embryos end up being discarded not because of any moral status of
those embryos, but rather because it is an overinclusive consequence of a regime
protecting the PHI of those which are brought to term.
107
For some sources troubling this consequence of selection, see, for
example, Nat Hentoff, Down Syndrome Genocide, CATO INST. (Nov. 29, 2011),
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/down-syndrome-genocide;
Jonathan Lange, People with Down Syndrome Deserve Our Love, Not Genocide,
THE FEDERALIST (Mar. 21, 2018), https://thefederalist.com/2018/03/21/people-
syndrome-deserve-love-not-genocide/; Mayrav Saar, The End of Down
Syndrome, N.Y. POST (Nov. 13, 2011, 5:00 AM),
https://nypost.com/2011/11/13/the-end-of-down-syndrome/; Kavin Senapathy,
Down Syndrome Screening Is Not About Eliminating A Group of People, FORBES
(Jan. 25, 2016, 11:05 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kavinsenapathy/2016/01/25/down-syndrome-scree
ning-is-not-about-eliminating-a-group-of-people/#3a5a13372811; Brian Skotko,
Will America Cull People with Down Syndrome?, USA TODAY (Nov. 16, 2011),
https://www.pressreader.com/usa/usa-today-international-edition/20111116/282
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accessing PHI for the purposes of genetic enhancement helps
suggest how the best-interests standard exists on a spectrum:
sometimes accessing PHI can be used to prevent a person from
coming into existence with debilitating pain, and sometimes it can
be accessed for non-therapeutic reasons like a parental preference
for eye color. The further on the spectrum in the direction of the
latter of these, the less justified would any given PHI access be from
a best-interests standard.
108
The likely incorporation of genomic sequencing into newborn
screening programs on near horizons further speaks to the need for
reform in the direction of limiting disclosures to parents of their
child’s PHI. Bearder v. State, a case reaching the Minnesota
Supreme Court in 2011, exemplifies how states might move to
protect PHI in the context of newborn screening.
109
The case
involved plaintiffs raising the issue of whether the state’s retention
of Guthrie cards without the consent of parents constituted
unauthorized use of the subject infants’ PHI within the meaning of
the state’s privacy law.
110
In Bearder, nine families sued the state of
Minnesota and its Department of Health over its collection, use,
storage, and dissemination of the blood samples and test results of
694748959166; Tim Stanley, Down’s Syndrome People Risk ‘Extinction’ at the
Hands of Science, Fear and Ignorance, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 18, 2016, 9:45 AM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/22/downs-syndrome-people-risk-exti
nction-at-the-hands-of-science-fe/; Chen Wang et al., Gene-Edited Babies:
Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences’ Response and Action, THE LANCET (Dec.
3, 2018), https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-
6736(18)33080-0/fulltext; George F. Will, Questioning the ‘Final Solution’ for
Down Syndrome People, N.Y. POST (Mar. 16, 2018, 9:24 PM),
https://nypost.com/2018/03/16/questioning-the-final-solution-for-down-syndrom
e-people/.
108
At the same time, it could be argued that even some enhancements would
be justifiable or justified from the perspective of a best-interests standard. See,
e.g., ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND
JUSTICE (2000); Julian Savulescu, In Defence of Procreative Beneficence, 33 J.
MED. ETHICS 284, 287–88 (2007) (arguing in favor of certain germline
enhancements in the interests of future children); Julian Savulescu & Guy
Kahane, The Moral Obligation to Create Children with the Best Chance of the
Best Life, 23 BIOETHICS 274 (2009).
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See Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766, 766 (Minn. 2011).
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their newborn infants without the parents’ written consent.
111
Minnesota state law allowed for the screening of newborns for
certain metabolic disorders, which:
[1] require[d] the Commissioner of Health to
prescribe the manner of testing, recording, and
reporting . . . newborn screening results; [2]
require[d] those who perform[ed] screenings to
inform parents that the blood samples and test results
may be kept by the Department of Health; and [3]
allow[ed] parents to either decline having their
infants tested or require the blood samples and test
results be destroyed after the screening.
112
Without a specific request for a blood sample’s destruction by the
subject newborn’s parent, part of the sample would be retained.
113
The Department of Health had entered into contracts with Mayo
Medical Laboratories to perform screening on the subject samples,
where the contractual arrangement also permitted Mayo to use
excess blood samples “for studies unrelated to the newborn
screening program if, and in addition to other requirements, the
samples ha[d] been de-identified or Mayo ha[d] obtained the written
consent from the children’s parent or legal guardian.”
114
At issue
was the State Genetic Privacy Act of 2006, which provided that
“genetic information” about an individual:
(1) may be collected by a government entity . . .
or any other person only with the written informed
consent of the individual; (2) may be used only for
purposes the individual gave written informed
consent for; (3) may be stored for only a short time
which the individual gave written informed consent;
and (4) may be disseminated only: (i) with the
individual’s written informed consent; or (ii) if
necessary in order to achieve purposes described by
clause.
115
111
Id. at 769.
112
Id. at 770 (citations omitted).
113
Id.
114
Id. at 771.
115
MINN. STAT. § 13.386(3) (2019).
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The Genetic Privacy Act defined “genetic information” broadly:
(a) “Genetic information” means information
about an identifiable individual derived from the
presence, absence, alteration, or mutation of a gene,
or the presence or absence of a specific DNA or RNA
marker, which has been obtained from an analysis of:
(1) the individual’s biological information or
specimen; or (2) the biological information or
specimen of a person to whom the individual is
related. (b) “Genetic information” also means
medical or biological information collected from an
individual about a particular genetic condition that is
or might be used to provide medical care to that
individual or the individual’s family members.
116
The plaintiffs argued that the Genetic Privacy Act required that the
Department of Health obtain informed consent before it was
permitted to collect, use, store, or disseminate the newborns’ blood
samples after the completion of their newborn health screenings.
117
The Department of Health countered that the Genetic Privacy Act
did not control its handling of newborn blood samples because the
blood samples were not “genetic information” under the Act, and
because “the newborn screening statutes ‘expressly provide[d]’ that
the Department of Health [could] use, store, and disseminate the
genetic information without first [having] obtain[ed] written
informed consent.”
118
The court found that the DNA contained in the infants’ blood
samples brought the blood samples within the ambit of the state’s
Genetic Privacy Act, rendering the state’s practices of retaining
these samples for further research and study without consent to be
unlawful, at least without parental consent.
119
The court then
considered whether the Department of Health was exempt from the
Genetic Privacy Law’s restrictions and determined that the newborn
screening statutes expressly provided the agency with such an
exception to the consent requirement in its collection and use of
116
MINN. STAT. § 13.386(1) (2019).
117
Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 2011).
118
Id. at 771–72.
119
Id. at 770.
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genetic information, but only to the extent that the Department was
authorized to “(1) administer newborn screening by testing samples
for heritable and congenital disorders, (2) record and report test
results, (3) maintain a registry of positive cases for follow-up
services, and (4) store test results as required by federal law.”
120
In
other words, the court noted important limitations on the scope of
the state’s access to PHI without express parental consent.
121
On the one hand, therefore, Bearder exemplifies ways in which
newborn screening programs treat the newborn as a distinct person
with unique PHI recognized to be deserving of privacy from third
parties, implicating an obligation on the part of public authorities
holding that information at least to solicit and receive affirmative
consent of the subject’s parents in collection, use, storage, and
dissemination of that information. On the other, the consent that the
court found missing in Bearder was not the presumed consent of the
child, but rather that of parents.
122
That is to say, the court did not
question the default view that there is little to no need to ensure
privacy from parents as third parties, and in fact, several state
statutes explicitly grant parents control over their children’s
newborn screening results.
123
In contrast with the current terrain, this Article posits that
newborn genetic information should be better protected against all
third parties, including parents when parental access to and
disclosure of that PHI is not justified in the best interests of the child.
Clinical applications of genomics in prenatal, neonatal, and pediatric
care raise the risk that parents will soon be entitled to access
unprecedented amounts of their child’s PHI. The National Institute
120
Bearder, 806 N.W.2d at 776; MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
GENETIC PRIVACY LAW AND THE BEARDER CASE 5,
https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/genprivlaw.pdf.
121
See Bearder, 806 N.W.2d at 776.
122
Id. at 774–75, 779 (Anderson, J., concurring) (describing the statute as
creating an informed consent “requirement that responsible parties inform parents
of their right to object to the tests or have their infant’s blood samples and test
results destroyed,” while the newborn’s own consent to the return of the
newborn’s PHI to parents is an “implied rather than express authorization”).
123
E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124975 (West 2019); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §132:10-a (2019); OLKA. STAT TIT. 21, § 21-1165 (2019); TEX.
HEALTH&SAFETY CODEANN. § 33.0111 (West 2019).
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of Child Health and Human Development, for instance, is currently
exploring the possibility of newborn genomic screening through
initiatives like BabySeq in Boston, PediSEQ in Philadelphia, and
Basic3 in Houston.
124
As the medical community’s capacity to
screen, sequence, and collect data continues to expand, it becomes
apparent that the return of genomic results could easily extend, for
example, to knowledge about late-onset health conditions like
Huntington’s disease—PHI that arguably has little to nothing to do
with healthcare decisions that parents would need to make on behalf
of their children during minority such that disclosure thereof is not
justified by parents planning to act in the child’s best interests.
125
The perinatal context thus appears to be one of the most
consequential points in an individual’s lifetime with respect to third-
party access to their PHI. Beyond fetal sequencing and neonatal
screening, parents may again seek to gain access to a child’s
genomic information if a child exhibits symptoms of an
undiagnosed condition in infancy and early childhood. Beyond early
childhood, though, genomic testing of children is less common.
126
Unless genome sequencing is done for a precise, targeted reason
through partial sequencing, prevailing medical guidelines
recommend that parents receive results of diagnoses and risk
assessments for conditions that are life-threatening or can be
ameliorated only in childhood.
127
Professional recommendations of
organizations like the American Society of Human Genetics and
124
NIH Program Explores the Use of Genomic Sequencing in Newborn
Healthcare, NAT’L INSTITUTES HEALTH (Sept. 4, 2013),
http://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/nih-program-explores-use-geno
mic-sequencing-newborn-healthcare; see Carey Goldberg, Baby DNA: Boston
Researchers Find Childhood Genetic Risks in 9 Percent of Newborns, WBUR
(Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.wbur.org/commonhealth/2019/01/03/deep-dna-
testing-babyseq; Ian Krantz & Nancy Spinner, Applying Genomic Sequencing in
Pediatrics, CLINICAL SEQUENCING EXPLORATORY RES., https://cser1.cser-
consortium.org/projects/29 (last visited Oct. 26, 2019); Sharon Plon et al.,
KidsCanSeq, CLINICAL SEQUENCING EVIDENCE-GENERATING RES., https://cser-
consortium.org/projects/27 (last visited Oct. 26, 2019).
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But see The Week Unwrapped: War Guilt, Genetics, and the Decline of
the Pub (Nov. 30, 2018) (downloaded using Apple Podcasts). I am grateful to
Kate Olson for bringing this to my attention.
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Ross et al., supra note 5, at 234.
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McCullough et al., supra note 5, at e978.
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American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics since 1995
have generally supported a nuanced approach to the return of results
to minors in accordance with their ability to handle the results
individually.
128
III. PHI IN THEWOMB: A PRECURSOR TOMINORS’ RIGHTS TO
THEIROWN PHI AND PROSPECTIVE ISSUES WITH PARENTAL
REPRODUCTIVERIGHTS
The previous Parts have revealed how few protections minors
have with regard to their own PHI. While some professional
recommendations at least seem cognizant of the danger that this
problem will become amplified in a healthcare system increasingly
relying on genomics, the default view nevertheless remains that a
child’s PHI broadly belongs to parents unless the child is either
emancipated or is sexually active and seeking refuge under the
federal reproductive rights system.
In many respects, as mentioned, a failure to protect PHI anytime
in childhood can be a failure with consequences that reverberate
throughout a lifetime. Examination of a child’s entire genomic
sequencing analysis is a stark example of access that seems
unnecessary or disproportionate to the purposes of detecting issues
that manifest in minority and thus lend themselves to parental
decision-making, but it is a possibility that could become not only
more common but even routinized within the context of newborn
screening unless safeguards are enacted. It is surprising that, given
the likely direction of healthcare and pediatrics toward incorporating
genomics, there have been very few voices in the legal literature
willing to press the matter back one step further: if unlimited access
of PHI in the neonatal context seems problematic, it would seem that
accessing fetal PHI in utero would be problematic for similar
reasons and remain as such under Roe v. Wade’s regime that
critically defines legal personhood only to begin after a mother
decides to give birth.
Much like newborn screening, people have utilized this mode of
accessing PHI since at least the 1960s.
129
The advent of
128
See Botkin et al., supra note 21.
129
See infra notes 132–138 and the sources therein.
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amniocentesis was a catalyst that first made it possible to obtain
parts of a person’s health information before birth; the procedure
had been used in the late-nineteenth century to reduce pressure from
excess amniotic fluid, but it was only after the discovery of “Barr
bodies” by the 1950s that researchers less than a decade later were
able to use amniocentesis to determine the sex of a fetus.
130
Tests
revealing fetal sex also soon enabled screening against sex-
chromosome-linked defects like erythroblastosis fetalis,
hemophilia, and Duchenne muscular dystrophy. Further discoveries
in 1959 and 1966 enabled the procedure to be used to test for trisomy
21.
131
The 1960s in many ways generally signaled the new role in the
law of a “science of the unborn,” as it were, especially in federal
administrative law, centrally motivated not only by developments in
science but also by the ability to harness scientific tools to respond
to two widely publicized spikes in serious birth defects—one caused
by contraction of German measles during pregnancy,
132
and another
130
Malcolm Ferguson-Smith, Amniocentesis, in ENCYCLOPEDIA GENETICS
60, 60–61 (Sydney Brenner & Jeffrey Miller eds., 2001).
131
Wiley H. Finely, Normal/2l-Trisomy Mosaicism: Report of Four Cases
and Review of the Subject, 11 AM. J. DIS. CHILD. 444, 444–47 (1996); Jérôme
Lejeune et al., Étude des chromosomes somatiques de neuf enfants
mongoliens, 248 C.R. SEANCESACAD. SCI., 1721, 1721–22 (1959).
132
In addition to the outbreak of congenital rubella syndrome (“CRS”) births
in the U.S. and elsewhere during the 1960s, defects were also brought into the
national spotlight as a result of the media personality and reporter Sherri Finkbine.
After using pills containing thalidomide that her husband had obtained while in
Europe, it was not until her pregnancy had significantly advanced that either of
them learned of the risks that the drug posed to the unborn fetus. It likely would
have been legal for her to have obtained a therapeutic abortion on the grounds of
medical necessity, the only reason for which abortions were permitted in Arizona
at the time. However, in addition to a flurry of public backlashes and threats, she
was turned down by several physicians in the U.S. who feared prosecution for
performing an abortion. Given what she knew about the devastating effects of
CRS, Mrs. Finkbine reflected in a Life magazine interview, “There is life
there[.] . . . But is it life when you can’t dress yourself, run, walk, dance, play
games, have dates? If I had no choice, I would have the baby. But I have a way to
prevent this tragedy, this sadness.” LESLIE REAGAN, DANGEROUS PREGNANCIES:
MOTHERS, DISABILITIES, AND ABORTION IN MODERN AMERICA 86 (2010)
(quoting Abortion—With the Future Dim, Should the Unborn Die?, 53 LIFE 33
(1962)). Moreover, she noted that she “could be only a partial mother to the other
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as a side-effect of the recently available pharmaceutical,
thalidomide (often prescribed at the time for morning sickness).
133
One of the profoundest changes that took place after these spikes in
birth defects was the creation of the FDA’s efficacy standards in
1962. The Kefauver-Harris amendment to the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, enacted by Congress in response to public concerns
regarding thalidomide births, began requiring pharmaceuticals not
only to demonstrate that they were safe at the pre-market stage, but
also that they were effective.
134
After the implementation of these
standards and FDA’s new labeling requirements, pharmaceuticals
that carried teratogenic risks would have to be clearly labeled
“Category D” or “Category X” before they could be marketed.
135
Further, before they could be marketed, they would have to be run
through the “Segment I” (fertility and general reproduction),
four” children, so bringing the fetus to term would mean “the others would be
cheated of part of their birthright.” Mrs. Finkbine ultimately traveled to Sweden
to obtain an abortion, expressing her “belief that God had offered her ‘the power
to prevent’ the birth of a ‘malformed baby.’” Id. at 89 (quoting Sherri Finkbine,
The Baby We Didn’t Dare to Have, 120 REDBOOK 99 (1963)).
133
The effects of thalidomide on the fetus depend on when in the pregnancy
it is taken, and it is unclear how many children were affected in the 1960s. Some
have suggested the drug affected between 10,000 and 20,000 births globally. Carl
Zimmer, Answers Begin to Emerge on How Thalidomide Caused Birth Defects,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/8458855.stm.
During the period from 1958 to 1961 when thalidomide was licensed in the United
Kingdom, 2,000 babies were born with defects; of these, half died within a few
months, and at least 466 had survived until 2010. Nick Triggle, Apology to
Thalidomide Survivors, BRIT. BROADCASTINGCORP. (Jan. 14, 2010, 13:13 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/8458855.stm. Numerous wrongful life and
wrongful birth actions would be brought on behalf of children a decade after the
above birth defect outbreaks from the 1960s, most often for CRS. E.g., Gleitman
v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692–93 (N.J. 1967); Stewart v. Long Island Coll.
Hosp., 283 N.E.2d 616, 616 (N.Y. 1972); Jacobs v. Theimer, 507 S.W.2d 288,
290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Dumer v. St. Michael’s Hospital, 233 N.W.2d 372,
373 (Wisc. 1975).
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Kefauver-Harris Amendments Revolutionized Drug Development, FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/consumers/consumer-updates/kefauver-harris-amendments
-revolutionized-drug-development (last updated Sept. 10, 2012).
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FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES OFAMERICA 22–23 (1983).
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“Segment II” (teratogenicity), and “Segment III” (perinatal)
protocols instituted by the FDA in 1966.
136
Abortion reforms before Roe also signaled a growing acceptance
of using access to fetal PHI in tandem with abortion to prevent
someone from living with serious or severe congenital disease. In
1962, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) published the Model
Penal Code, for example, which included a recommendation that
abortions be allowed in cases of a severe fetal defect.
137
“Colorado
became the first state to reform its abortion law based on the ALI’s
recommendation[,] . . . and by 1972, [thirteen] states had so called
ALI statutes.”
138
Thus, well before Roe, it began to be possible for
prospective parents to learn about fetal PHI for purposes of making
informed abortion decisions.
139
Similarly, well before Griswold v.
Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird, the FDA had begun approving
new oral contraceptives, i.e., “the Pill.”
140
As the next Part explores further, it is clear that the idea of fetal
PHI immediately suggests that protecting PHI in utero might seem
to clash with some of the more central values of the Court’s abortion
jurisprudence upholding or expanding on Roe. However, there is
nothing about this Article’s defense of the need to protect PHI in
utero that must come into conflict with the Court’s jurisprudence of
reproductive rights. To the contrary, it emphasizes that the issue of
an entity having its rights violated only arises if it is in fact not
136
See J.W. Kille, Regulatory Toxicology, in A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
TOXICOLOGY INNONCLINICALDRUGDEVELOPMENT 525 (Ali S. Faqi ed., 2016).
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MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft
1962).
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Rachel Gold, Lessons from Before Roe: Will Past Be Prologue?, 6
GUTTMACHER INST. REP. ON PUB. POL’Y 8, 9 (2003).
139
But see Luke Mintz, ‘Are We Entering a New Era of Eugenics in Which
People Like Me Will be Edited from the Population?’, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 9, 2019,
4:30 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/health-fitness/body/entering-new-era-
eugenics-people-like-will-edited-population/ (providing a perspective of a
disability rights activist with neurofibromatosis on the possibility of the condition
being genetically edited from the human population); see also note 107 and the
sources therein (problematizing the elimination of people with Down Syndrome
from the population through selective abortion).
140
PLANNED PARENTHOOD FED’N OF AM., THE BIRTH CONTROL PILL: A
HISTORY 8 (2015), https://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/1514/3518/7100/Pil
l_History_FactSheet.pdf.
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aborted. In the scenario of making an informed abortion decision,
an abundance of PHI could be returned to pregnant women without
it being necessary to divulge the entirety of the information
generated about the fetal genome, as this would include ample
information beyond that which is useful in such a decision. Today,
even divulging the entire fetal genome does not become problematic
as a matter of law if it motivates the decision to abort, since in such
a case, no legal person would come into existence with violated
rights.
141
The possibility of protecting legal rights in the womb has
centuries-old origins,
142
extending as far back as Blackstone and
Coke in the contexts of probate and criminal law.
143
U.S. courts by
the outset of the nineteenth century would follow the English
common law in according rights to the unborn—for example, in
cases where a testator died before the birth of a child identified to
take under a will.
144
Succinctly put, in all of these contexts, such
141
To emphasize, as mentioned, gaining access to three billion base pairs on
its own hardly amounts to information (indeed, many regions of sequences are
intronic DNA, regions identified as not synthesizing any proteins), unless a
sequencing company analyzed it or one had the right equipment and wherewithal
to compare it against published results of sequences that have been associated
with particular risks, diseases, or other characteristics. See supra note 11.
142
Many of the cases creating this precedent involve scenarios in which an
heir under a will was not born until after the testator died. E.g., Thellusson v.
Woodford (1799) 4 Ves. 227, 227; Wallis v. Hodson (1740), 2 Atk. 114, 114; Doe
v. Clark (1795) 2 H BI 399, 399.
143
If “the childe be born alive and dyeth of the potion, battery, or other cause,
this is murder,” Coke had noted, yet he and Blackstone held the same view that
prenatal injury causing stillbirth is not murder but rather “merely [] a heinous
misdemeanor.” The crime was thus a lesser one if the prenatal injury did enough
damage that it killed the fetus before birth. Cases as early as the eighteenth century
reflected that courts followed the English common law, requiring that prenatally
injured fetuses first be born before dying for their deaths to be treated as murder.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, vol. 1, bk.
1, 126 (1765); EDWARDCOKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING HIGH TREASON; AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN,
AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 58 (1644).
144
E.g., Biggs v. McCarty, 86 Ind. 352, 363 (Ind. 1882) (treating a fetus as
a tenant in common with its mother); Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass. 255, 258 (Mass.
1834) (extending legal personhood to the unborn in a case where the testator died
nearly nine months before the child was born, i.e., the legal person judicially
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rights only materialize in those instances in which the fetus is born
and thereby recognized as a legal person. Even the condition of
being born, Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. would conclude on
the Massachusetts Supreme Court, is insufficient on its own. Rather,
under the doctrine of “prospective conditional liability”
(“prospective” in the sense of forward-looking, and “conditional” in
the sense of being dependent on a plaintiff being born alive) that he
introduced into tort law, the person born must additionally stay alive
long enough to maintain standing in any litigation asserting the
person’s rights.
145
This born-alive prong of the doctrine of prospective conditional
liability would be fatal to prenatal tort claims for over half a century
(that is, often the prenatally injured plaintiff would die from the
injuries before litigation had concluded),
146
from the first time a
court entertained such an action in 1884. Indeed, while Holmes
recognized the first prenatal tort in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of
Northampton, this novelty was of little use to the infant plaintiff, the
case being dismissed because the infant had already died from the
prenatal injuries.
147
The national terrain of the prenatal tort only
recognized and allowed to take under a will was a conceptus that had barely been
conceived); Aubuchon v. Bender, 44 Mo. 560, 569 (Mo. 1869) (recognizing a
contingent remainder could vest in the unborn); Hill v. Moore andWatters, 5 N.C.
233, 234 (N.C. 1809) (finding the distributive share of the unborn child vested in
the child’s mother).
145
This doctrine articulated that “an injury transmitted from the actor to a
person through his own organic substance, or through his mother, before he
became a person” could theoretically stand “on the same footing as an injury
transmitted to an existing person through other intervening substances outside
him . . . the argument would not be affected by the degree of maturity reached by
the embryo at the moment of the organic lesion or wrongful act.” Dietrich v.
Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 16 (Mass. 1884) (emphasis added).
146
See, e.g., Smith v. Luckhardt, 19 N.E.2d 446, 447–48 (Ill. App. Ct. 1939)
(The plaintiff died at age thirteen as the result of an x-ray her mother underwent
when she was a pre-viable fetus, and the court found it dispositive that she was
not viable at the time.); Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company, 139
N.Y.S. 367, 371 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916) (implying that the defendant could not
reasonably have known the plaintiff’s mother to have been pregnant).
147
Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 15 (“There was testimony, however, based upon
observing motion in its limbs [after premature birth], that it did live for ten or
fifteen minutes . . . . The court below ruled that the action could not be
maintained; and we are of opinion that the ruling was correct.”). In other words,
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began in 1946, when the first federal court allowed recovery,
148
spurring state courts across the country to follow suit in recognizing
the action.
149
Therefore, by the mid-twentieth century, a legal
framework already existed recognizing the importance of protecting
some rights in utero, including the original prenatal tort claim (one
in which an injury to a fetus could become the basis of a tort action
committed against the fetus if it is later born alive), and also,
beginning in the 1960s, extending to the “wrongful life” action as
well (a malpractice claim alleging that a child born alive would
never have been born but for the negligent advice or treatment given
to the parents by a healthcare provider—such as a failure to warn
parents about risks of serious congenital disease).
150
One of the important social conditions behind this development
of prenatal torts was the transition of childbirth from homes to
hospitals,
151
a crucial change propelled by federal efforts from the
Judge Holmes created the doctrine of prospective conditional liability as a two-
pronged doctrine—a defendant may only be held liable where (1) doing so would
be in the interests of a born person, and (2) a person is in fact born alive—but the
infant who was the plaintiff of Dietrich (brought ad litem by parents) was no
longer alive to have interests that could be benefited by holding the defendant
liable, and arguably did not even live long enough after birth to constitute being
“born alive” within the meaning of the doctrine. Id. at 15–17.
148
Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 143 (D.C.C. 1946) (“The law is
presumed to keep pace with the sciences and medical science certainly has made
progress since 1884.”).
149
Cases showing states choosing not to recognize the prenatal tort include:
Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 108 So. 566 (Ala. 1926); Smith v.
Luckhardt, 19 N.E.2d at 446, 451, 477; Bliss v. Passanesi, 95 N.E.2d 206, 207
(Mass. 1950); Newman v. City of Detroit, 274 N.W. 710, 711 (Mich. 1937); Buel
v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 154 S.W. 71, 72–73 (Mo. 1913); Drabbels v.
Skelly Oil Co., 50 N.W.2d 229, 223 (Neb. 1951); Stemmer v. Kline, 26 A.2d 489,
491 (N.J. 1942); Drobner v. Peters, 133 N.E. 567, 568 (N.Y. 1921), overruled by
Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691 (N.Y. 1951); Berlin v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc.,
16 A.2d 28, 28 (Pa. 1940); Gorman v. Budlong, 49 A. 704 (R.I. 1901); Magnolia
Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 78 S.W.2d 944, 950 (Tex. Comm’m App.
1935); Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 159 N.W. 916, 917 (Wisc.
1916).
150
See Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849, 852–53 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963);
Williams v. State of New York, 223 N.E.2d 343, 343 (N.Y. 1966).
151
E.g., CHARLOTTEBORST, CATCHINGBABIES: THEPROFESSIONALIZATION
OF CHILDBIRTH, 1870–1920 91 (1995); JUDITH WALZER LEAVITT, BROUGHT TO
BED: CHILDBEARING INAMERICA, 1750–1950 171 (1986).
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New Deal era into the postwar Hill-Burton grants of the Truman
administration,
152
among other causes. Within broader goals of
addressing the national healthcare system, these grants were critical
in facilitating and promoting hospital renovation and construction.
Of course, with scientists in the early twentieth century
rediscovering Mendelian inheritance, unpacking the chromosome,
identifying the function and location of the gene, and discovering a
host of disease-causing microorganisms, many had turned to
hospitals viewing them as a bastion of the promises of scientific
medicine.
153
This new context of childbirth involving medical professionals
and hospital patients outside the home gave rise to the first cases in
which a plaintiff alleging prenatal injury prevailed on the claim, but
a system of formal prenatal tort recovery had yet to solidify. For
over half a century since Dietrich in 1884, courts were either
unwilling to adopt the doctrine of prospective conditional
liability,
154
or they found other reasons for denying recovery in cases
of prenatal injury—for example, finding that the defendant could not
reasonably have known that the plaintiff’s mother was pregnant at
the time of the prenatal injury.
155
When the first courts finally
152
Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 725, 60 Stat. 1040,
ch. 958 (1946) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 291o (1976)).
153
See JOEL HOWELL, TECHNOLOGY IN THE HOSPITAL: TRANSFORMING
PATIENT CARE IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY 5 (1995) (describing “shiny
new machines” like x-ray and equipment found in hospital laboratories as
incentives hospitals offered to draw in consumer patients); see also JAMESMOHR,
LICENSED TO PRACTICE: THE SUPREMECOURTDEFINES THEAMERICANMEDICAL
PROFESSION 12–13 (2013) (noting how the term “regular” was one that the
AMA’s physicians applied to their own healing practices that emphasizes
laboratory findings, systematic study, and peer-review and replication of results,
in contrast with alternative schools of healing like Thomsonianism, botanism,
hydropathy, homeopathy, and eclecticism).
154
The concept of prospective conditional liability, not accepted by courts,
posited that, in some circumstances, fetuses are owed a civil duty. Smith v.
Luckhardt, 19 N.E.2d 446 (Ill. App. Ct. 1939) (the plaintiff having died at age
thirteen as the result of an x-ray her mother underwent when she was a pre-viable
fetus, and the court finding it dispositive that the injury occurred before the
plaintiff was a viable fetus).
155
See Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R.R Co., 139 N.Y.S. 367, 371 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1913) (“But it is not the duty of a carrier to scrutinize its passengers for
the detection of unborn children, to the end that they, although latent, may be
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recognized the prenatal tort, this latter excuse would have been
unavailing, as the relevant actions arose as the result of prenatal
injuries (like cerebral palsy) sustained by use of forceps during
professional medical deliveries.
156
Despite the initiation of this jurisprudence recognizing prenatal
physical injuries as cognizable legal harms to living individuals, the
next step never occurred, namely, of recognizing an individual’s
right to seek compensation for prenatal informational injury.
157
One
reason this is somewhat surprising is because the legal doctrine of
informed consent was already well-developed by the time that states
across the country began recognizing the right to seek recovery for
one’s own prenatal physical injuries from the 1950s onwards.
158
regarded as passengers . . . . [Y]et it would not be liable to the child for mere
negligence in the carriage of the mother, as it would owe its duty as a carrier to
the mother and not to the child.”).
156
Scott v. McPheeters, 92 P.2d 678, 679 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939); see
Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 143 (D.C.C. 1946).
157
Though considerably different, the “wrongful life” action might be
argued to be capable of protecting something approximating this—e.g., the
prenatal informational injury being a failure to disclose information to parents
that would have meant the plaintiff would not have come into existence. This is a
stretch from the present context, however, as wrongful life would only construe a
failure to divulge PHI as a legal wrong (e.g., failing to return fetal PHI to parents
indicating fetal anomalies that would have led parents to choose abortion), rather
than divulging fetal PHI as a wrong.
158
See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1972). As I have
discussed elsewhere,
Shack v. Holland exemplifies how the concept of informed
consent would start to be applied in the context of prenatal
injuries, revealing the transition away from battery in favor of
negligence actions. Even though some new forceps had been
available by the 1930s that were designed to protect the fetal
head, and even with the Caesarean section as a safer option
obviating the need to use forceps, the case also indicates that
this source of prenatal injury had not been eradicated. The
plaintiff in Shack was alleged to have been injured by the
defendant obstetrician during childbirth and left “permanently
maimed and deformed.” Given that the plaintiff was twenty-two
years old at the time of the lawsuit, however, a central issue was
whether the statute of limitations had already run. That
question, in turn, depended on whether the plaintiff’s claim was
a battery or a negligence action, since the latter had a longer
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Consequently, people were left without protections or the possibility
of recovery for injury to their PHI in the perinatal context as parents
simultaneously started to have greater access to that information
through venues like diagnostic uses of amniocentesis. While the
majority view is that parental access to such fetal information is
guaranteed as a right subsumed within their federal reproductive
rights,
159
born individuals have generally been left without recourse
in terms of unjustified perinatal informational injuries.
statute of limitations. Without needing to create a new
definition of informed consent from whole cloth, the court was
able to rely on the state’s statutorily provided definition: Lack
of informed consent means the failure of the person providing
the professional treatment or diagnosis to disclose to the patient
such alternatives thereto and the reasonably foreseeable risks
and benefits involved as a reasonable medical practitioner
under similar circumstances would have disclosed, in a manner
permitting the patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation.
Luke Haqq, The Impact of Roe on Prenatal Torts: On the Public Policy of
Unexpected Children, 13 J. TORT L. 1, 30 (forthcoming 2020) [hereinafter Haqq,
The Impact of Roe on Prenatal Torts] (citing Shack v. Holland, 389 N.Y.S.2d 988,
993 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976)). Applying Dietrich, the court found “that a conditional
prospective liability to a fetus is created when an unborn child’s mother is not
sufficiently informed of the risks, hazards, and alternatives of the delivery
procedure administered.” Shack, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 993. The court then brought this
statutory definition of informed consent to bear in the context of childbirth:
Having concluded that the unborn plaintiff has a cause of action
and that the duty to disclose the reasonable foreseeable risks
involved is grounded in negligence, the immediate question is
whether this plaintiff has a cause of action against this
defendant for lack of informed consent to the mother of the
child here involved . . . . The court finds that although the
obligation to disclose runs to the mother, plaintiff, Neil Shack,
then unborn but within his mother’s womb, comes within the
area of persons to be protected. The lack of informed consent
of the mother would have its effect upon the fetus to be born for
good or ill. A child in its mother’s womb is a foreseeable
circumstance. Conduct, which creates a risk of harm to a
woman, includes also a risk of harm to her unborn child.
Id.
159
Haqq, The Impact of Roe on Prenatal Torts, supra note 158, at 43–44
(providing national maps of prenatal torts, which show how most states recognize
the wrongful birth action, and nearly all have recognized the tort for wrongful
conception as well). These actions recognize abortion and contraception as
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These decades are the timeframe within which parents also
became capable of accessing the PHI of their children through
newborn screening programs. However, the failure to protect their
PHI was—and continues to be—more palpably problematic in the
in utero context than in newborn screening programs. This is true as
a matter of pure quantity: a sole condition, PKU, was a key catalyst
for the emergence of newborn screening programs.
160
By contrast,
even at that time in the 1960s, there were already more conditions
than could be tested for in utero with clinical applications—several
types of trisomies, retinitis blastoma, and hemophilia, for
instance.
161
It is also true as a matter of function: the overriding
purposes of newborn screening programs are to screen for
conditions that can be effectively treated in infancy or early
childhood to save children born with such conditions from lifelong
debility.
162
Accessing PHI in utero, by contrast, is more relevant to
informed consent rights to be apprised of risks that are material or germane to
reproductive decision-making. Id.
160
See, e.g., DIANE B. PAUL& JEFFREY P. BROSCO, THE PKU PARADOX: A
SHORT HISTORY OF GENETIC DISEASE 54–59 (2013) (describing other relevant
developments to include tests for congenital syphilis risks in the early twentieth
century, growing consumer confidence in scientific medicine from sulfa drugs,
penicillin, the Salk and Sabin vaccines, and increased attention given to diseases
causing mental impairment under the Kennedy administration).
161
See generallyMalcolm Ferguson-Smith, supra note 130 (discussing uses
of amniocentesis to identify such conditions by the midcentury).
162
At the same time, newborn screening panels also extend to many
conditions that are less severe than PKU. While highly effective treatments for
otherwise highly debilitating congenital conditions seems to be a clear case where
the minor’s consent could be presumed, routine aural screening for deafness, by
contrast, seems much more problematic or complex, since it is not necessarily the
case that giving parents this PHI of their children is in the best interests of the
child. If both options could be grounded in presumed consent—e.g., if cochlear
implants with partial hearing and total deafness are incommensurable, but equally
reasonable options (that is, assuming that neither can be said to be worse than the
other with respect to the child’s expected wellbeing)—then it could be argued that
parents should be given access to this PHI. See e.g., Mara Mills, Do Signals Have
Politics? Inscribing Abilities in Cochlear Implants, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
SOUND STUDIES 321, 237 (Trevor Pinch & Karin Bijsterveld eds., 2011). But see
infra Part V (suggesting only releasing PHI from newborn screening that is
necessary to avert serious, severe, or lethal congenital conditions).
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fulfilling parental wishes about what kind of child they want to
have.
163
The differences between accessing PHI in newborn screening
programs for specific detection purposes versus conducting broad
genomic sequencing in utero are exacerbated by the possibility that
prenatal PHI will not only continue to be used for analysis of disease
and deformity in order to inform abortion decisions, but also with
new ways of editing of genes at the embryonic stage. It is true that
today’s newborn screening panels do screen for and return results
about numerous conditions,
164
but again, the overwhelming purpose
of these programs is to improve the health and wellbeing of the
children born with regard to problems that would otherwise affect
them in childhood. For this reason, such accessing of the PHI of
newborns is easily justified in that implied consent from the subject
of the PHI can be presumed because accessing information about
propensity to disease is materially within the child’s best interests.
Even though the later-born child is incapable of consent at the time
of PHI access, the fact that such unauthorized access to PHI can be
needed to stave off lifelong debilitating health concerns suggests the
child would offer “retrospective” consent once rationally capable of
doing so. This might even include retrospective consent in the
prenatal context not to come into existence with a lethal disease like
Tay Sachs.
The interests of the unborn and prospective parents begin to
decouple, however, since fetal genomic information in this context
serves an important function in a parent’s right to choose, and indeed
163
See infra note 182 (explaining the Supreme Court’s definition of abortion
as a liberty, autonomy, and privacy right, protected by the “life” and “health”
exceptions carved out by Roe and Bolton); see also Lawrence B. Finer et al.,
Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives,
37 PERSP. ON SEXUAL&REPROD. HEALTH 110, 112 (2005) (describing personal
inconvenience as the motivation behind almost three-quarters of abortions
reported). Since Roe, any best-interests standard has not existed (some would
argue it entered with the undue-burden standard of Casey, but this fails to account
for the expanse of the health and life exceptions mandated by Roe and Bolton)
because priority is given to the pregnant woman’s liberty, autonomy, and privacy
interests, as well as her mental and physical health interests.
164
See Lewis & Goldenberg, supra note 93, at 560 (explaining how newborn
screening identifies over 12,000 individuals annually with congenital conditions
necessitating further specialized care).
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studies have shown sustained trends over several decades that
women will be more likely to obtain an abortion if the PHI that they
access indicates fetal pathology than if they never had such
information. In the U.S. and elsewhere, these studies indicate the
vast majority of women who obtain testing and receive negative
results choose abortion.
165
By contrast, it is difficult to conceptualize
how the access of certain PHI in utero (as, for instance, with the
disclosure of an entire fetal genome) could similarly be grounded in
the presumed informed consent of the later-born child when that
information does not serve a purpose of disease prevention but
instead becomes increasingly relevant to new potentials regarding
gene editing and parental decision to create designer babies. In such
a case, the best interests served in something like a newborn
screening program are no longer present.
IV. THE IMPACT OF FEDERALREPRODUCTIVERIGHTS ON PHI IN
CHILDHOOD
The decades showing high rates of selective abortion after PHI
is accessed in utero for informative purposes speaks to how this
Article’s proposal does not negate the abortion right but also presses
the need for reform with respect to limiting the potentially abundant
PHI disclosures in utero to information relevant either to abortion
decisions or childcare factors that are justified by a best-interests
standard. Nevertheless, as mentioned, this Article’s
recommendations do not require a fundamental reworking of Roe v.
Wade.
166
This Part considers how the proposal to protect PHI in
165
See, e.g., Tamsen Caruso et al., Impact of Prenatal Screening on the Birth
Status of Fetuses with Down Syndrome at an Urban Hospital 1972-1994, 1
GENETICS MEDICINE 22 (1998); Mathias B. Forrester & Ruth D. Merz,
Epidemiology of Down Syndrome, 65 TERATOLOGY 207 (2002); Ralph Kramer et
al., Determinants of Parental Decisions After the Prenatal Diagnosis of Down
Syndrome, 79 AM. J. MED. GENETIC 172 (1998); Caroline Mansfield et al.,
Termination Rates After Prenatal Diagnosis for Down Syndrome, Spina Bifida,
Anencephaly, and Turner and Klinefelter Syndromes: A Systematic Literature
Review, 19 PRENATAL. DIAGNOSIS 808 (1999); Jaime L. Natoli et al., Prenatal
Diagnosis of Down Syndrome: A Systematic Review of Termination Rates (1995-
2011), 32 PRENATALDIAGNOSIS 142, 150 (2012).
166
To reiterate, any informational right would follow the model of Dietrich
and thereby comport with Roe’s notion of personhood. That is,Dietrich took legal
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utero might be thought to be incompatible with abortion, specifically
with the Supreme Court’s framework that defines it as a woman’s
liberty right, as her right to bodily integrity, and as a right to privacy,
but suggests that none of these rights conceptualizations provides a
knock-down reason against protecting PHI in utero because of its
legal importance to born individuals.
First, it is worth reemphasizing why abortion is the most
pertinent of the federal reproductive rights. As mentioned, with
regard to PHI at the juncture of parental avoidance of birthing
children with certain diseases or disorders, parents reasonably have
considerable power prior to conception to select which children to
avoid creating by taking into account factors like carrier status,
workplace teratogenic risks,
167
threats from mosquito-borne
diseases in possible vacation destinations,
168
and parental age. Any
such information that parents use prior to conception to inform their
sexual and reproductive choices draws either on the parents’ own
PHI or on exogenous, environmental factors. Unlike the case of
selective abortion, such options do not involve accessing genetic or
rules from probate law (the “for the interests” rule) and criminal law (the “born
alive” rule) and merged them into the two-pronged doctrine of prospective
conditional liability. While this doctrine introduced liability for prenatal injuries
into tort law (i.e., protections for the unborn), it only extended legal rights to the
subset of the unborn who are eventually born and stay alive. In this way, the
Dietrich model does not challenge Roe’s principle of the non-personhood of the
conceptus prior to birth; if the route of abortion is taken, then no legal person is
in fact born alive (failing the born-alive prong) with interests that could be
furthered by holding a third-party liable for prenatal injuries (failing the for-the-
interests prong). If abortion is chosen, then Dietrich ascribes no legal personhood
to the unborn because the situation cannot satisfy both prongs of the doctrine of
prospective conditional liability, but if abortion is not chosen, the Dietrich model
permits a range of rights to be accorded to the unborn.
167
E.g., Peters v. Texas Instruments, Inc., C.A. No. 10C-06-043 (JRJ), 2011
WL 4686518, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. 2011) (plaintiff seeking recovery under his
state’s worker’s compensation statute for an “insult to his reproductive system”
that resulted from exposure to toxic substances at work and led to his child’s birth
with retinoblastoma); Catherwood v. American Sterilizer Co., 498 N.Y.S.2d 703,
704 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (discussing preconception chromosomal damage
claimed to have been caused by the plaintiff’s mother’s exposure to ethylene
oxide).
168
See Haqq, Of Mosquitoes, Adolescents, and Reproductive Rights, supra
note 1, at 828.
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genomic information that can be individuated from that of parents
(i.e., prior to any unique combination of sperm and egg).
Possibilities like IVF, PGD, and embryonic gene editing do
highlight, though, that sometimes, individuated PHI can exist even
before implantation.
169
Here, one anticipated objection becomes apparent: even if such
genetic or genomic information can be claimed to be that of an
individuated entity, perhaps it should not be considered to be distinct
in utero because this would be incompatible with upholding abortion
as a bodily integrity right, since any conceptus—short of being kept
alive by an incubator—obviously falls entirely within the body of
the pregnant woman carrying it. Indeed, the Court was explicit in
recognizing abortion as a bodily integrity right.
170
If abortion qua a
bodily integrity right could be interpreted to encompass the genetic
or genomic information of the conceptus, and thus the PHI of a later-
born individual, one implication is that it would extend the abortion
right as a bodily integrity right reaching far beyond birth in time and
far beyond the bodies of pregnant women. Under this line of
thinking, fully grown adults who learn that their PHI was accessed
or disclosed in utero would be denied full protections for their PHI
because it would be considered part of their mothers’ bodies. This
is deeply implausible, as it would effectively deny adults a right to
the inviolability of their own PHI on the grounds that their PHI and
bodies once existed in utero.
171
This Article, in contrast, has
169
SeeGiulia Cavaliere,Genome Editing and Assisted Reproduction: Curing
Embryos, Society or Prospective Parents?, 21 MED. HEALTH CARE& PHIL. 215,
216 (2018).
170
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 835 (1992) (“[I]f Roe is seen
as stating a rule of personal autonomy and bodily integrity, akin to cases
recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate medical treatment or to bar
its rejection, this Court’s post-Roe decisions accord with Roe’s view that a State’s
interest in the protection of life falls short of justifying any plenary override of
individual liberty claims.”). But see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (the
Court citing to its prior rulings permitting vaccination and involuntary
sterilization as suggestive that it has never found that “one has an unlimited right
to do with one’s body as one pleases”).
171
Nevertheless, HIPAA effectively treats fetuses themselves as the PHI of
pregnant women: the statute defines “genetic information” to include not only an
individual’s genetic tests and the genetic tests of family members, but also “[a]
fetus carried by the individual or family member who is a pregnant woman.”
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emphasized the importance of protecting an individual’s PHI—
whether (later-born) conceptus, child, or adult—throughout the
entirety of the individual’s lifetime; a failure to take a nuanced,
minimum-necessary approach (divulging information only if
relevant for informing the rights to contraception and abortion)
would expand abortion right far outside the context of pregnancy,
affecting the informational privacy rights of children and adults.
Another line of argument that it is permissible to gain
nonconsensual access to PHI in utero might be rooted in the
conceptualization of abortion as a privacy right, rather than as a
bodily integrity right. Continuing the line of precedent begun by
Griswold v. Connecticut,
172
this might be argued to be the privacy
of parents to the decisions they make in the bedroom. More often,
especially after Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
173
it is less a general
privacy of sexually active people but rather specifically the privacy
of pregnant women—privacy in their sexual, reproductive, and
personal choices, and privacy in their doctor-patient relationships.
Indeed, before Casey, one state’s supreme court declared in
recognizing the wrongful conception action, “The United States
Supreme Court in Roe and Griswold has recognized that a woman
has the right to plan the size of her family,” even though nothing
about the latter limited its protections just to women.
174
In this way,
Public Welfare, 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018). First, as suggested below, such a
recognition in HIPAA might be necessary for it to comport with the federal
reproductive rights, so it would be conclusory to take the matter to be settled as a
reason to ignore any arguments that challenge the federal reproductive rights. See
notes 13, 28, and accompanying text (explaining that an “individual” under
HIPAA simply means the “subject” entity of the PHI, and providing examples of
technologies like fetal genomic sequencing in which the individual that is the
subject of the PHI arguably seems more to be the conceptus rather than the
pregnant woman). Second, this definition in HIPAA is unsurprising, given its
dearth of protections for minors generally, as already discussed. See supra Part II.
172
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
173
See generally Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (finding spousal consent and spousal
notification requirements to be unconstitutional under Roe).
174
Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 653 (Ga. 1984)
(citing Roe, 410 U.S. 113 and Griswold, 381 U.S. 479).
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state courts began to expand the abortion right in a gendered
direction even before the Court explicitly did so in Casey.
175
This line of argumentation used against protecting fetal PHI in
utero would be somewhat implausible because it presupposes what
it sets out to establish. It asserts that a given act is permissible by
claiming that the Constitution contains a right of individuals to
privacy, but then leverages that assertion for the precise purpose of
claiming that born individuals do not have any right to privacy of
their PHI in utero. If there indeed is a right to privacy found within
the Constitution, then surely a question arises as to balancing
interests, as a compelling justification for refusing to keep any PHI
private in utero must be based on some reason other than the fact
that pregnant women have a recognized right to privacy over the
abortion decision. At the very least, such reasoning would need to
articulate why one individual’s right to privacy (the mother’s)
outweighs another individual’s countervailing privacy (that of the
later-born individual with PHI).
Still, it could be argued that there are different kinds or degrees
of privacy interests at stake. This seems more promising, as the
Court has gestured towards recognizing a constitutionally protected
right to informational privacy but has not explicitly recognized it. It
first suggested this in two cases from 1977,Whalen v. Roe andNixon
v. Administrator of General Services, but fell short of articulating
that such a right exists.
176
The Court revisited the issue in 2011 in
NASA v. Nelson, a case in which contract employees at Caltech
brought suit against the university, NASA, and the Department of
Commerce, claiming such an informational privacy right was
violated by NASA’s open-ended background check, which required
an effectively comprehensive release of personal information to
avoid termination.
177
Similar to the argumentation it employed in
Whalen, the Court in NASA supposed such a right existed for the
sake of argument, but ultimately skirted the question by finding that
175
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878, 901 (striking down spousal consent and
spousal notification requirements for abortions as unconstitutional).
176
See generally Nixon v. Adm’r of General Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977)
(failing to recognize a constitutional right to informational privacy); Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (determining that the case before the Court did not
create an “invasion of any [privacy] right”).
177
NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138–39 (2011).
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the state possessed a sufficiently compelling interest anyway to gain
access to this personal information.
178
If the Court does recognize an informational right to privacy
within the Constitution, this issue would return to the need to
balance competing privacy interests. While the right to privacy over
abortion decisions is required under the Court’s reproductive rights
jurisprudence, a born individual should also have a right with
respect to informational privacy over PHI in utero; complete denial
of PHI protection in utero is not narrowly tailored to accommodate
both privacy interests. This concern will continue as genetic and
genomic information becomes increasingly accessible and therefore
increasingly capable of becoming un-private. The black box
metaphor, discussed in the final Part, suggests a balance recognizing
the privacy interests of pregnant mothers, especially in their abortion
decisions, as well as the interests of born individuals.
The most plausible and direct approach for claiming that
protecting PHI in utero is incompatible with the abortion right is the
argument that it conflicts with abortion as a liberty and autonomy
right. Though the Court focused on abortion as a privacy right in
Roe, it made its status as a liberty and autonomy right clear in its
subsequent abortion jurisprudence.
179
In later abortion cases, it
explicated that this constitutionally protected liberty guarantees not
just privacy but also decisional autonomy, including a pregnant
woman’s freedom to “determine her life’s course”
180
and exercise
“control over her destiny”
181
by opting to terminate the pregnancy.
178
Compare id. at 155 (recognizing the “regulatory duty to avoid
unwarranted disclosures” while acknowledging the government’s interest), with
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605–06 (“We therefore need not, and do not, decide any
question which might be presented by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated
private data—whether intentional or unintentional—or by a system that did not
contain comparable security provisions. We simply hold that this record does not
establish an invasion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
179
E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113–54 (1973) (the majority opinion
only mentioning “liberty” four times—but each time as part of finding a right of
privacy within such a constitutional guarantee of liberty—and ruling, “We,
therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion
decision.”).
180
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
181
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992).
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Certainly, part of Roe’s social significance lay in the recognition of
the abortion right as a venue for promoting greater de facto equality
in the labor market, by giving sexually active women greater control
over choices like whether to have children, when to have them, and
what sorts of children they want to raise.
182
From this perspective,
the ability to gain access to the PHI of a conceptus has long been
assumed to be a right shrouded in the federal reproductive rights and
their intersection with informed consent doctrine,
183
a view created
in large part by state courts and legislatures and by legal
academics.
184
Moreover, in addition to this federal precedent, there
is ample state law that has similarly identified abortion as a personal
liberty and right to autonomy; most relevantly, as mentioned, this
182
See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (“Maternity, or additional offspring, may force
upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be
imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also
the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the
problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and
otherwise, to care for it.”). To understand the scope of the abortion right since
Roe, an element continuing after Casey, it is essential to take the mandated health
exception at all stages of pregnancy in light of how the Court defined “health” in
Roe’s companion case, released on the same day. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179, 192 (1973) (defining “health” in the abortion context such that the exception
permits that “medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors—
physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to
the wellbeing of the patient. All these factors relate to health.”). The Court
explained in Bolton that this broad understanding of the health exception permits
physicians “the room [they need] to make [their] best medical judgment. And it is
room that operates for the benefit, not the disadvantage, of the pregnant woman.”
Id.
183
See generally Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 804–06 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (mentioning the intersection between reproductive rights and informed
consent).
184
A casebook on tort law from 1977, for example, would contend that Roe’s
protection of first-trimester abortions for any reason “should constitute a forceful
argument against any decision denying recovery for wrongful birth based on
public policy.” JAMES A. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND
LITIGATION 353 (1977). Similarly, a law review article from 1982 would declare
that “all decisions since Roe v. Wade that deny recognition of the action [for
wrongful birth of a healthy child] are ignoring the Supreme Court rulings
regarding the individual’s right not to have children.” Donna K. Holt, Wrongful
Pregnancy, 33 S.C. L. REV. 759, 793 (1982).
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jurisprudence at the state level has developed through over half a
century of wrongful conception and wrongful birth litigation.
185
Informed consent affected the original prenatal tort, and it also
was a central impetus behind the emergence of three new actions—
the wrongful life, wrongful birth, and wrongful conception torts.
186
The wrongful birth tort first arose in 1967,
187
one of several cases
arising after the birth of infants suffering from congenital rubella
185
Nearly every state recognizes a parental right to recover in tort for
wrongful conception, over half recognize wrongful birth, and fewer than half a
dozen recognize wrongful life. See Haqq, The Impact of Roe on Prenatal Torts,
supra note 158, at 43–45 (providing fifty-state maps of the current terrain of
wrongful conception, wrongful birth, and wrongful life claims). For a stark, recent
example of the public policy forged within these cases, in 2015, a Washington
couple obtained a $25,000,000 award of general damages in their wrongful birth
action.Wuth v. LabCorp, 359 P.3d 841, 846–47 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (involving
a child born with a chromosomal translocation rather than having been aborted, a
child who had already been awarded $25,000,000 in special damages for
accommodations and expenses necessitated by the associated impairments
(experienced over his anticipated seventy-year lifespan), which was possible
because Washington is one of only a handful of states that recognizes the claim
for wrongful life, while most other states ban it). See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis,
Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 494 (Wash. 1983) (recognizing the wrongful life action for the
first time).
186
See generallyHaqq, The Impact of Roe on Prenatal Torts, supra note 158
(describing prenatal torts alongside the rise of informed consent doctrine). For a
recent example, the Iowa Supreme Court first recognized the wrongful birth
action in 2017, recognizing that “the woman must be informed of all material
facts, including the likelihood the child will be born with a severe birth defect.”
Plowman v. Fort Madison Cmty. Hosp., 896 N.W.2d 393, 405 (Iowa 2017) (the
court curiously citing fetal protective statutory requirements about disclosing
information about fetal pain before an abortion, offering an ultrasound, and other
measures as justifying the creation of this informed consent aspect of the state’s
interpretation of the abortion right). The court did consider the possibility that
“allowing wrongful-birth claims will stigmatize the disabled community,” but it
quickly found that any such stigma was outweighed by the importance of not
“closing the courthouse door” to women’s rights guaranteed by Roe. Id. at 406.
The court additionally considered the expressive impact not on the disabled
community but rather on the disabled child at issue in the lawsuit, but dismissed
this too, finding that “given Z.P.’s severe cognitive disabilities, there is nothing
in the record to indicate he will someday understand his parents sued over their
lost opportunity to avoid his birth.” Id. at 407.
187
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967).
54 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
syndrome (“CRS”).
188
This variant of action is brought by parents
and alleges that medical malpractice precluded their ability to make
an informed choice about whether or not to abort.
189
In other words,
wrongful birth cases involve parents as plaintiffs claiming they were
denied certain information, i.e., relevant parts of the PHI of their
child while a conceptus—a denial of information to which they
would not have consented at the time.
190
In one of the early wrongful
birth cases involving CRS, the mother of a child born with CRS
stated in her deposition, “I would have done the kindest thing that I
188
Stewart v. Long Island Coll. Hosp., 283 N.E.2d 616 (N.Y. 1972); Jacobs
v. Theimer, 507 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Dumer v. St. Michael’s
Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975).
189
The wrongful conception and wrongful life actions are somewhat less
germane than wrongful birth actions to questions about accessing another
individual’s PHI in utero or otherwise. Pre-conception, as mentioned, it seems
clear especially from the contexts of IVF and PGD that no identifiable individual
exists prior to conception, but rather reproductive material most plausibly seems
to be fully under the ownership of each parent individually. The wrongful life
action is brought by or on behalf of a child alleged to be injured by an infringement
of this informational right—before or after conception—that the plaintiff alleges
was the cause of the harm of facing life with serious congenital disease. Since it
concerns the child’s own right to otherwise avoid existence (and thus avoid the
protections of genetic privacy laws like HIPAA), it is less germane to this
Article’s focus directly on those individuals that are in fact born.
190
These actions raise problems even when they do not access the PHI of the
conceptus. The vast majority of abortions in the U.S. are not for the purposes of
selecting against disease, disorder, or impairment but rather for prudential or
socio-economic reasons—i.e., because the timing of pregnancy or prospect of
having a child was incongruent with personal preferences, professional ambitions,
or financial means. In other words, most abortions are of fetuses that otherwise
presumably would have been born healthy, rather than for the motives of
preventing someone from being born with congenital disease. Several states
permit parents to seek general damages for the pain and suffering of being denied
the chance to abort their child who was born healthy, furthering what many
consider to be an odious public policy. See e.g., Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337
S.E.2d 528, 536 (N.C. 1985) (describing the wrongful birth action as furthering a
public policy of “medical paternity suit[s]”); Haqq, The Impact of Roe on Prenatal
Torts, supra note 158, at 72–73 (“The scope of recovery [might encompass
recovery for infliction of extreme emotional distress,] roughly proportional to the
severity and lethality of the congenital condition.”).
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could have known to have done for her [counterfactually], and that
would have been to terminate the pregnancy.”
191
Grounding justifications for gaining access to another
individual’s PHI on the abortion right qua a liberty and autonomy
right, though initially seeming to provide the most plausible
justification, ends in circularity as well. First, there is an obvious
circularity in claiming that a failure to get consent or even presumed
consent (regarding PHI access) is justified with respect to the
importance of protecting consent (of prospective parents). If consent
merits protection, then it makes little sense to fail to protect it in the
name of protecting consent. Second, if reproductive rights were the
central value being protected, then the circularity would be a failure
to protect them in the name of protecting them—much of the PHI
that parents currently are able to access in utero is information that
would be material or germane to their child or prospective child’s
own sexual and reproductive choices in the future. As such, PHI
germane to those future choices could be argued to be protected by
Supreme Court jurisprudence granting minors reproductive
rights.
192
Third, it would be circular to ground any justification of
accessing PHI in utero without implied consent or best-interests
justifications on the availability of the wrongful birth action. State
precedent on reproductive rights piggybacks on the federal
reproductive rights, the former precedent depending on the latter.
While some federal courts have recognized the action for wrongful
birth, the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether
or not the ability to pursue that claim is found within the
Constitution. Moreover, even if it did find a wrongful birth action to
exist as a facet of the abortion right, wrongful birth is an
informational right; as such, it seems circular to claim that it is
permissible to deny protection for one individual’s informational
rights (privacy and non-disclosure of one’s PHI in utero) on the
grounds of upholding another individual’s informational rights
(parents’ rights to make an informed abortion decision, enforced
through wrongful birth claims).
191
Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1975).
192
See notes 55–57 and the sources therein.
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Of course, a few parries to the above points could be anticipated.
One might argue that there is no circularity because all these matters
have already been established by the federal reproductive rights and
parental rights jurisprudence.
193
In other words, for example, the
argument could be made there are no informational rights infringed
in utero because fetuses are not legal persons. If this were taken as
a categorical statement, it would be misplaced, since courts have
long been willing to accord fetuses an abundance of rights of legal
persons retroactively—e.g., in the mentioned probate context and
property law (as when a testamentary gift requires the interpretation
that a fetus be treated as a tenant in common with its mother),
194
and
eventually through prenatal tort actions, so long as they are born
alive (and not aborted spontaneously or through induced means, or
otherwise killed by prenatal injury).
195
More centrally, the riposte is
simply that claiming that the Court’s reproductive rights
jurisprudence has already settled the matter is to squelch any
conversations or discussions, such as those in this Article, that might
be interpreted to problematize that jurisprudence.
196
While this
Article’s thesis on the importance of protecting PHI in utero does
not necessitate any fundamental reworking of the federal
reproductive rights, and in fact does not even arise in terms of legal
rights until a decision whether or not to abort has been made, it still
provides one narrow set of reasons for understanding why that
jurisprudence might be incapable of protecting PHI as healthcare
increasingly turns to genetics and genomics.
Another parry might emphasize that most of these problems can
be explained in terms of a difference in degree, though not in nature,
of the rights to be protected. That is, it could be argued that a
conceptus itself both has its own PHI and is also itself the PHI of the
pregnant woman carrying it, such that a reflective choice to uphold
193
On the latter, see, for example, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214
(1972); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Myer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
194
E.g., Biggs v. McCarty, 86 Ind. 352, 362 (Ind. 1882).
195
See notes 142–155 and accompanying text (describing early prenatal
torts); see also note 164 (explaining how Dietrich’s model comports with legal
personhood as defined in Roe).
196
See, e.g., notes 178–181 and accompanying text (discussing the
jurisprudential development of abortion as an autonomy interest).
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implied consent or a best-interests standard in reasonably disclosing
and protecting PHI in utero involves a choice between incompatible
or incommensurable goals—respect for the PHI of the conceptus
and respect for the conceptus as a pregnant woman’s PHI.
197
This
reasoning seems plausible because it does not ignore the issue of
nonconsensual PHI access. Rather, it acknowledges it but
emphasizes that such access might be excused or justified by the
very same value of protecting an individual’s PHI (i.e., the
conceptus understood as the pregnant woman’s own PHI), on the
grounds that this value that is more efficiently furthered by favoring
treatment of the conceptus as a pregnant woman’s PHI rather than
an independent subject of PHI. To reify this objection, suppose that
a pregnant woman opts to have the fetal genome sequenced within
the first few months of pregnancy and then chooses to abort because
of the PHI she accesses—which is taken arguendo to be her own
PHI and also that of a distinct individual. The obvious reason that
the failure to protect the PHI of the conceptus is less legally
problematic, wrong, or bad is that the conceptus was aborted before
it ever learned that its own PHI had been accessed; no legal person
with rights ever comes into existence so the issue of access is not
problematic in the way it would be in cases in which a living person
with that PHI is born. Further, plausible arguments can be marshaled
that access for purposes of selective abortion can often be justified
from a best-interests standard (as with Tay Sachs). In contrast to any
harm in failing to bring someone with Tay Sachs or a non-lethal but
still serious condition into existence (e.g., perhaps one might argue
that there is a harm in not being able to experience existence), a
greater harm might be said to exist in a failure to respect and protect
the pregnant woman’s own PHI, given how life-altering the prospect
of raising a child with serious congenital disease would be, and
given that she can exercise control over such outcomes if she
accesses the PHI of the conceptus and forestalls the possibility by
choosing to abort.
197
For an introduction to the relation of incommensurability theory to
practical reason and ethics, see generally RUTH CHANG, INCOMMENSURABILITY
AND INCOMPARABILITY (2013) (discussing if, and how, values can be compared
to one another).
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Perhaps the most significant problem with this definitional or
attributional analysis of PHI is that it is in tension with the notion of
rights as absolute—generally, it seems that it is wrong to violate the
rights of another, and this wrongness is not premised on a degree of
harm measured by the other individual knowing that such rights
were violated. With the amount of PHI and other personal
information generated and stored today, it is precisely the fact that
people might otherwise be unaware when third parties like
marketing companies or hackers gain access to their information
that underscores the need for protecting and regulating PHI. If a
healthcare institution gave a marketing company unauthorized
access to a person’s PHI for financial gain, certainly this would
remain objectionable even if both actors assured that the person
whose PHI was accessed never knew about it.
A final challenge might problematize any ex ante attempt to
demarcate that individualized PHI exists in utero, and that it only
makes sense to claim this ex post. This challenges the underlying
problem about referring to two “individuals” who are reasonably
distinct recipients of protections like those of HIPAA. The challenge
in the prior paragraph accepts two sources of PHI but insists that the
value of protecting PHI in utero is usually or always outweighed by
the ends that are furthered through giving pregnant women access
to that PHI. This challenge, by contrast, denies that there are two
sources of PHI during pregnancy but rather only after birth, such
that there never were two sources of PHI if the conceptus was not
brought to term. Again, as this Article has shown, one clear reason
for not recognizing the conceptus as a distinct individual is that this
might create tension with Roe and related reproductive rights
jurisprudence. Still, it has also emphasized that both goals can be
accomplished—the rights to contraception and abortion could be left
uninhibited in terms of parents having access to information that
reasonably could inform their reproductive decisions, while still
cabining off some PHI from disclosure, namely, information that is
not salient for reproductive choices or healthcare decisions in
childhood.
Further, as a matter of legal personhood, this Article has also
shown that U.S. courts since the eighteenth century have recognized
that human life during its embryonic stages can have a panoply of
legal rights, though they can only be enforced after birth, thus
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recognizing two sources of rights rather than one.
198
Protecting PHI
in utero additionally does not depend on insisting that reproductive
material before conception ought to have distinct rights; to the
contrary, as mentioned, any PHI would belong to each parent
individually. It is certainly true that this means they could learn a
fair amount about their future child’s PHI at this stage through
testing and analysis, for example, at a clinic offering IVF and PGD.
This possibility does not dissipate value of protecting PHI in utero,
since the actual PHI of the child will be unique, not fully predictable
from the prospective parents’ own PHI that they can access prior to
conception. Finally, knowing prior to conception that one’s future
children will have certain PHI, like hereditary diseases, is something
that could also plausibly be justified with respect to presumed
consent, since any extent to which this constitutes accessing the PHI
of one’s future child is generally done with the best interests of the
future child in mind.
This point is a descriptive rather than a normative one: many
people opt to abort out of compassion and being humane—indeed,
as mentioned, an early abortion (in tandem with nonconsensual PHI
access in utero) that thwarts the birth of a child with severe
congenital anomalies can plausibly be justified with respect to
presumed consent and best interests of the child.
199
Given that most
abortion decisions are not premised on decisions made with regard
to fetal health anyway,
200
an argument favoring protection of PHI in
198
As one court after Dietrich would recognize, even without the new
possibility of alleging prenatal injuries in tort, it had already been well-established
that a conceptus “may be appointed an executor, is capable of taking as legatee or
under a marriage settlement, may take specifically under a general devise as a
child, and may obtain an injunction to stay wastes.” Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights
R.R. Co., 139 N.Y.S. 367, 369 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916); see also note 13 (providing
an example of how some PHI extraction methods seem more clearly than others
to be culling PHI from the conceptus more than the pregnant woman).
199
Here, the wrongful life becomes somewhat relevant, since it insists that
life with congenital impairment is a legally compensable harm; if this is accepted,
it would provide justification for accessing PHI and abortion for these reasons
grounded in compassion or humaneness. Cf. note 155 and the discussion therein
(suggesting that the wrongful life claim could be interpreted as encompassing at
least some prenatal informational injuries).
200
See supra note 182 (describing the broad scope of abortion recognized in
Roe and Bolton, and continuing after Casey). The Guttmacher Institute further
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utero comes as radical because it seems to challenge the present
perspective from which this unauthorized access is justified. Again,
however, the best-interests standard is irrelevant in cases of selective
abortion because no recognizable legal rights ever come to fruition
in such cases. Currently, broad access to fetal PHI without even
considering best interests in cases of selective abortion is justified
under the Court’s abortion jurisprudence,
201
state interpretations of
that jurisprudence most centrally in wrongful birth suits,
202
and
reports personal inconvenience, not humane selection, as the primary reason
behind abortion in the U.S.:
The three most common reasons [abortions are chosen in the
U.S.]—each cited by three-fourths of patients—were concern
for or responsibility to other individuals; the inability to afford
raising a child, and the belief that having a baby would interfere
with work, school or the ability to care for dependents.
Laurence B. Finer et al., supra note 163, at 112.
201
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (“[Our historical and
jurisprudential analysis] persuades us that the word ‘person,’ as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.”).
202
E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-719 (A), (C) (D) (2019); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-120-902 (a), (c) (2010); IDAHO CODE § 5-334 (1) (2019); KAN. STAT.
ANN. 60-1906 (a), (b) (2019); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 2931(1) (2019);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424, Subd. 2 (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04.1
(2019); OKL. STAT. tit. 63 § 63-1-741.12 (A)–(D) (2014); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 8305 (a) (1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-55-2, 21-55-3 (1981);
Phillips v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 1309 (D.S.C. 1983); Keel v. Banach, 624
So. 2d 1022 (Ala. 1993); Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982); Lininger v.
Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988); Rich v. Foye, 976 A.2d 819 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2007); Garrison v.Med. Ctr. of DE, 581 A.2d 288 (Del. 1989); Haymon
v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880 (D.C. 1987); Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415 (Fla.
1992); Atlanta Obst. & Gyn. v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557 (Ga. 1990); Siemieniec
v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987); Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d
1212 (Ind. 2000); Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520 (Iowa 1984); Arche v. United
States, 798 P.2d 477 (Kan. 1990); Grubbs v. Barbourville Health Ctr., 120 S.W.3d
682 (Ky. 2003); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988); Reed
v. Campagnolo, 630 A.2d 1145 (Md. 1993); Viccaro v. Milunksy, 551 N.E.2d 8
(Mass. 1990); Taylor v. Kurpati, 600 N.W.2d 670 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Wilson
v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1998); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528
(N.C. 1985); Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345 (Nev. 1995); Smith v. Cote,
513 A.2d 341, 348 (N.H. 1986); Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981);
Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978); Schirmer v. Mt. Auburn
Obstetrics & Gynecologic Assocs., 844 N.E.2d 1160 (Ohio 2006); Zehr v.
Haugen, 855 P.2d 1127 (Or. App. 1993); Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa.
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federal regulations like the terms of HIPAA.
203
Reform is therefore
needed to do better at protecting the informational rights of born
individuals. Under the current terrain, there is virtually no
justification assumed to be needed for any nonconsensual access. A
reformed terrain could still permit parental access to PHI in a range
of cases, but such PHI should be disclosed only if the disclosure is
justified to inform the rights to contraception and abortion and
broader parental rights from the perspective of best interests or
presumed consent of the later-born child. The final Part suggests that
such PHI in this reformed terrain should be contained in a “black
box” that is accessible only through the doctor-patient relationship
by the child, or by parents only selectively, namely, only if
disclosure is antecedently justified based on the child’s presumed
consent and best interests.
V. A BLACKBOX: PHI UNDER A “RIGHTS-IN-TRUST” FRAMEWORK
Though this Article has centered on the possibility of protecting
and respecting PHI in utero, it has also emphasized this option as
part and parcel of protecting PHI over an individual’s lifetime, since
unauthorized disclosure to a third party generally cannot be undone.
This final Part makes initial gestures in describing what reform in
this arena of public policy might look like, providing a theoretical
framework and practical examples of giving children greater
ownership and control over their own PHI.
The previous Parts have shown that some of a future child’s PHI
can be ascertained before conception (e.g., through IVF and PGD),
that federal and state reproductive rights generally give parents full
access to it in utero, that all states routinely return some elements of
1981); Schloss v. MiriamHosp., No. 98-2076 (RJH), 1999WL 41875 (R.I. Super.
Jan. 11, 1999); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Naccash v.
Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483
(Wash. 1983); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985); Dumer v. St.
Michael’s Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d
288 (Wyo. 1982).
203
Public Welfare, 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018) (defining the conceptus as
PHI of pregnant women, rather than a distinct entity with PHI, by defining
“genetic information” protected by HIPAA to include “[a] fetus carried by the
individual or family member who is a pregnant woman.”).
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the child’s PHI to parents in newborn screening programs, and that
HIPAA and other privacy laws regulating PHI continue this regime
up to the age of majority.
204
The reasons for gaining unauthorized,
nonconsensual access to the PHI of another individual in utero seem
most plausible when they can be grounded in presumed consent,
carving out a limited exception to the background importance of
otherwise protecting this information. For the rest of the PHI, this
nonconsensual access becomes problematic.
In computing and engineering, a “black box” denotes a system,
process, or object that can be understood in terms of inputs and
outputs without fully knowing the internal workings.
205
Legal
scholars have recently borrowed this concept to speak of a turn to
“black box medicine” in a healthcare system dealing with
increasingly opaque algorithms and large quantities of raw PHI
data.
206
Authors have also applied the concept in biology and
genetics, discussing the human body as existing within the history
of genetics as an “organism [that originally] remained a black box,”
one “being quickly opened up by modern biology.”
207
Such data is
generated not only from clinical visits but also from wearable
devices, internet activity, and consumer purchases, with reliance on
big-data PHI further increasing significantly with growing reliance
on genomic sequencing.
208
In the present context of protecting PHI
204
See supra Section II.A (explaining the default of treating parents as
personal representatives of their children in the child’s healthcare decisions).
205
With some related descriptions and methodology arising in circuitry and
computing in the early twentieth century, it appears the black-box term first
started to be applied to such processes by the 1950s and 1960s. See, e.g., NORBERT
WEINER, CYBERNETICS: ORCONTROL ANDCOMMUNICATION IN THEANIMAL AND
THE MACHINE vii-x, xi n.1 (1961); ASHBY ROSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
CYBERNETICS 86 (1956); Vitold Belevitch, Summary of the History of Circuit
Theory, 50 PROC. INST. RADIO ENGINEERS 848, 848–49 (1962).
206
See Roger A. Ford & W. Nicholson Price, Privacy and Accountability in
Black-Box Medicine, 23 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2016). See generally W.
Nicholson Price, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 429–
30 (2017) (providing an in-depth discussion of black box medicine).
207
JOHN GERHART & MARC KIRSCHNER, CELLS, EMBRYOS, & EVOLUTION
613 (1997).
208
See Joshua S. Talboom & Matthew J. Huentelman, Big Data Collision:
The Internet of Things, Wearable Devices and Genomics in the Study of
Neurological Traits and Disease, 27 HUM.MOLECULARGENETICSR35, R35–R39
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from nonconsensual disclosure to parents (or other third parties),
such opaque PHI processing and analyzing will continue to increase
the role of physicians and other clinical actors as gatekeepers for
PHI access.
In this gatekeeper role, as well as being a central target of
regulation by laws like HIPAA, clinical actors working with PHI are
those responsible for disclosing or not disclosing it to parents,
prospective parents, and minors. For the same reason, they also are
the most relevant actors interpreting the medical-necessity,
presumed-consent, or best-interests exceptions—the actors who
decide whether or not a given disclosure of PHI is permissible.
Relevant data computing and processing systems themselves could
also be designed in the clinical context to grant access to PHI only
when authorized in actuality (like when minors seek to access their
own PHI) or could be justified according to presumed informed
consent (e.g., a return of results to parents indicating PKU in a
neonate).
209
In short, the proposal to keep PHI private throughout a lifetime,
and not just in adulthood, could be realized by working to ensure
that an individual’s PHI is kept within a metaphorical black box—
one that is otherwise opaque to unauthorized parties but provides a
return of relevant results for those who are authorized. Granted, it
could be the case that minors who gain access to results about their
genome would be too immature to know what to do with the
information.
210
Beyond the benign possibility that such information
would not be useful to minors, it is also possible that providing it
(2018). See generally Morris W. Foster & Richard R. Sharp, The Contractual
Genome: How Direct-to-Consumer Genomic Services May Help Patients Take
Ownership of Their DNA, 5 PERSONALIZED MED. 399 (2008) (compiling and
analyzing patients’ DNA outside of the clinical context).
209
See generally Jennifer Kulynych & Henry T. Greely, Clinical Genomics,
Big Data, and Electronic Medical Records: Reconciling Patient Rights with
Research When Privacy and Science Collide, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 94 (2017)
(discussing the problematic intersections of big data and electronic medical
records with HIPAA-covered entities’ use of genomic data).
210
Cf. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (granting minors a more
limited right to abortion than adults, citing to their “inability to make critical
decisions in an informed and mature manner and the importance of the parental
role in child rearing.”).
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could even come as a harm, thus potentially running in tension with
the best-interests standard and presumed consent.
For example, the Presidential Commission for the Study of
Bioethical Issues describes one person’s experience who learned
from his ophthalmologist at age thirteen that he would, at some point
in his life, go blind from retinitis pigmentosa.
211
“It was like having
a time bomb inside of me,” he remarked about the prognosis.
212
His
vision did steadily deteriorate after college, and he lost the majority
of his eyesight by the time he was thirty-three.
213
“The irony,” he
concluded in retrospect, “is the anticipation was much worse than
the actual loss. It was a relief to stop worrying about when the loss
would occur.”
214
Though this may reflect the experiences of some,
systematic reviews have found “insufficient evidence to inform a
nuanced understanding of how children respond to genetic
testing.”
215
What is more, some PHI like genomic results might be hard for
adults to understand as well, in which case difficulty in
understanding is less of an objection to allowing minors to access
their own genomic PHI. As one genetic counselor recently
recounted of an adult patient, “He had highlighted the consent form
very carefully and he highlighted the word ‘genome’ and he kept
saying ‘gnome’ . . . he was like ‘What’s a gnome? What does that
mean? . . . Is that in my body? Can you take it out of me?’”
216
The
integration in recent years of user-friendly technologies like iPads
into both public education and clinical medicine can support
211
PRESIDENTIALCOMM’N FOR THESTUDYBIOETHICS ISSUES, PRIVACYAND
PROGRESS INWHOLEGENOMIC SEQUENCING 23 (2013).
212
Id.
213
Id. at 22.
214
Id.
215
Christopher H. Wade, Effects of Genetic Risk Information on Children’s
Psychosocial Wellbeing: A Systematic Review of the Literature, 12 GENETICS
MEDICINE 317, 317 (2010); see also Kathrine James et al., Impact of Direct-to-
Consumer Predictive Genomic Testing on Risk Perception and Worry Among
Patients Receiving Routine Care in a Preventive Health Clinic, 86 MAYO CLINIC
PROC. 933, 934 (2011) (conducting a test study involving in-depth interviews,
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comprehension during childhood and into adulthood of key concepts
like DNA and genetics.
217
The Integrative Genomics Viewer, for
example, allows individuals who have their genome sequenced to
view the entire sequence on an iPad, with interactive features
enabling them to zoom in to particular segments and variants, with
explanations of their significance.
218
In high school, topics like
genetics can further be incorporated into classes in the natural
sciences, for example, through discussions of inheritance in
biology.
219
Reasons of public health could also recommend against return
of PHI to the individual subjects of that PHI inasmuch as knowledge
of one’s genetic and genomic information reinforces unhealthy life
choices that impose a public burden. For example, public health
genomic policies could attempt to identify genotypes that modulate
smoking status, initiation, cessation, and treatments.
220
While using
such an initiative to identify individuals who have a high
susceptibility to cancer might motivate them to quit, it could also
“enable[] those who are unsuccessful in quitting to blame genetic
factors, which would thereby decrease motivation.”
221
Facilitating
such genetic fatalism affects the public interest not only because of
smoking-related disabilities, but also because the testing itself
would be an inefficient use of resources if it did change individual
behaviors.
222
Further, inasmuch as knowledge of one’s genetic
217
See Helga Thorvaldsdóttir et al., A Genomic Data Viewer for iPad, 16
GENOME BIOLOGY 46, 46 (2015).
218
Id.
219
E.g., Sherree Kassuba, Environmental Causes of Birth Defects, YALE-
NEWHAVEN TEACHERS INST., http://www.yale.edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/1982/
7/82.07.07.x.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2019) (detailing a unit on birth defects
designed for ninth-grade students).
220
See, e.g., Evy Cleeran et al., Public Health in the Genomic Era: Will
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Disease?, 69 ARCHIVES PUB. HEALTH 1, 6–7 (2011).
221
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information can cause anxiety about one’s health,
223
the predictive,
prognostic role of genomics (its role in providing risk assessments
rather than diagnoses) could contribute to unnecessary surveillance
and further testing.
224
The idea of storing a child’s PHI within a black box is similar to
legal philosopher Joel Feinberg’s argument that children possess a
set of moral rights to an “open future,” that is, rights not to have
important life choices like personal healthcare decisions determined
by others.
225
He also recommends against imposing important
healthcare decisions on individuals when they are too young to
possess the necessary maturity and decisional autonomy to make
those decisions wisely, a reason potentially against giving minors
more direct access to their own PHI.
226
Feinberg’s claim is that it is
the autonomy of adults to make informed choices that is valuable,
and their “rights-in-trust” should be protected in childhood.
227
Numerous authors since the 1990s have applied Feinberg’s
argument in the context of genetic testing, namely, for the
proposition that it is generally better to delay until adulthood the
decision of whether or not to view one’s genetic results.
228
In contrast to this focus on the rights of adults, this Article has
emphasized the need for a secure, private repository for an
individual’s PHI from conception up to majority. In practical
223
Though not focusing on adolescent populations, recent surveys have
found mixed results, with some people experiencing anxiety from knowing
genomic results, others equanimity, and others enthusiasm. See, e.g., Jacqueline
Duffour et al., Reproductive Decision-Making in MMR Mutation Carriers After
Results Disclosure: Impact of Psychological Status in Childbearing Options, 25
J. GENETIC COUNSELING 432, 433–34 (2015) (finding that twelve percent of
participants experienced initial stress from learning results, but that stress
decreased over time).
224
See LAURINDA HARMAN & FRANCES CORNELIUS, ETHICAL HEALTH
INFORMATICS 470, 713 (2015).
225
Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD?
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124, 125–26
(William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980).
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See generally Joseph Millum, The Foundation of the Child’s Right to an
Open Future, 45 J. SOC. PHIL. 522 (2014) (providing a review of contexts in which
authors have applied the open-future concept).
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implementation, a black box might draw on analogue principles that
have already been developed in the research rather than the clinical
context. Discussions about the professional ethics of “biobanking,”
for example—the reposition and use of biological samples for
research purposes—have addressed the storage of PHI taken from
minors.
229
As with the recommendations in pediatrics canvassed
above,
230
research principles for the treatment of an individual’s
biological material and information have recognized that “older
minors,” unlike “small children,” have greater and perhaps
sufficient capacities “to understand the meaning and implications of
the research and to give a documented agreement to it.”
231
In the
clinical context, similarly, professional recommendations consider
informed consent to be possible in older children and adolescents.
232
It therefore may be useful, especially given other mentioned risks of
returning PHI,
233
for the algorithms and analyses underlying a black
box of an individual’s PHI to stage results as appropriate to the
individual’s age and the nature of the PHI.
Other analogue principles in research could further be used for
clinical ethics concerning the return of a minor’s PHI not just to the
minor but also to public authorities. Adhering to a commitment to
proportionality, for example, might justify access if great harm to
229
E.g., Kristien Hens et al., Developing a Policy for Paediatric Biobanks:
Principles for Good Practice, 21 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 2, 2–3 (2013); Heidi C.
Howard et al.,Whole-genome Sequencing in Newborn Screening? A Statement on
the Continued Importance of Targeted Approaches in Newborn Screening
Programmes, 23 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 1593, 1593 (2015) (“The primary
objective of NBS [newborn screening programs] should be the targeted analysis
and identification of gene variants conferring a high risk of preventable or
treatable conditions, for which treatment has to start in the newborn period or in
early childhood.”).
230
See generally supra Part II (discussing the recommendations of
professional organizations including the AMA, American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (“ACOG”), American Academy of Pediatrics
(“AAP”), and Clinical Sequencing Exploratory Research Pediatric Working
Group (“CSER-PWG”)).
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Hens et al., supra note 229, at 2.
232
See generally supra Part II (discussing a professional attitude favorable
toward greater control of PHI in later childhood and adolescence).
233
See supra notes 209–227 and accompanying text (considering reasons in
favor of withholding rather than disclosing PHI).
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others could be avoided through nonconsensual access to the
minor’s PHI.
234
As this Article has suggested, however, such a
principle seems to be violated unless the return of results from
genomic sequencing is limited only to necessary genomic PHI.
235
Further, “great harm to others” risks being an exception that
swallows the rule, given the real benefits to present people and
future generations that could be gained by allowing public
authorities to access a minor’s full genomic PHI.
236
A more
restricted permission for limited access within the clinical context,
supported by legal precedent,
237
might allow release of otherwise
confidential information only when this could avert serious harm or
death to another (presently existing) individual. Finally, such a
balancing could also be grounded on independent ethical or moral
considerations—such as a commitment to respect other persons,
including future people, by acting in relation to others on grounds to
which they could not reasonably object.
238
234
Hens et al., supra note 229, at 2.
235
Even with targeted sequencing, many of the same underlying ethical
issues about the return of PHI arise about the return of incidental findings. See
supra note 104 and the sources therein.
236
A balancing of these competing values might be possible, for example,
by making a considerable financial contribution that is placed in trust and released
once minors reach the age where they are reasonably capable of managing their
finances, which could potentially be grounded on their anticipated informed
consent.
237
Cf. Tarasoff v. Regents of California, 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976)
(finding a duty to disclose otherwise confidential personal information within a
professional duty to warn third parties of risk serious harm or death).
238
In contemporary philosophy, T.M. Scanlon’s notion of respect as
grounded in reasonable objection has been particularly influential. See generally
T.M. SCANLON, WHATWE OWE EACH OTHER 153 (2000) (proffering a theory of
normative reasoning and moral justification in which respect for others is
understood in terms of “principles for the general regulation of behavior that no
one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general
agreement”). Perhaps most relevantly, Scanlonian contractualism has been
applied in the context of duties owed to people before they exist. See, e.g., Rahul
Kumar, Wronging Future People: A Contractualist Proposal, in
INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE 251 (Axel Gosseries & Lukas Meyers eds., 2009).
For more on this literature of duties to future people, see, for example, Jan
Narveson, Future People and Us, in OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 85
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With PHI stored inside a metaphorical black box, staged access
according to authorization could certainly be more nuanced than the
brief sketches canvassed above. If PHI were of reproductive
significance, for instance, there could be public health reasons for a
physician to reveal it to a minor, say, in early adolescence,
239
though
such a possibility might encounter opposition by people who believe
disclosing it to minors implicitly and objectionably endorses sexual
activity prior to majority. Indeed, if a child’s PHI is given to parents,
they might forget to inform their child (e.g., if the results were
revealed in infancy), or they might be motivated by personal
convictions not to return results to children out of a concern that the
information will raise the chances that the minor will consider
abortion. Rather than taking a position on this issue, it is enough to
say that it is likely that this domain will become a much more
contested space between the political right and left over abortion
politics.
CONCLUSION
The topic of regulating PHI in the perinatal context will continue
to pose vexing questions and speaks to the necessity of substantial
reforms to personal privacy laws governing healthcare data and even
abortion law, as medicine turns to genomic healthcare and as gene
editing sparks the imagination with possibilities of new frontiers.
This Article has introduced a space that raises new considerations
that will inevitably arise in the context of reproductive healthcare. It
thus emerges as radical because Roe v. Wade is the law, but law
which does not respond to concerns over PHI of children, neonates,
and fetuses, especially outside the context of making of an abortion
decision. Reforms are still possible regardless of whether federal
reproductive rights are revisited. Keeping an individual’s PHI in a
black box and recognizing informational rights thereto not only
PERSONS 4 (1984); R.M. Adams, Existence, Self-interest, and the Problem of Evil,
13 NOÛS 53, 53 (1979); Caspar Hare, Voices from Another World: Must We
Respect the Interests of People Who Do Not, and Will Never, Exist?, 117 ETHICS
498, 498 (2007); Seana V. Shiffrin, Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility,
and the Significance of Harm, 5 LEGAL THEORY 117, 117 (1999); J. David
Velleman, Persons in Prospect, 36 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 221, 221 (2008).
239
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throughout childhood but also as far back as conception is a proposal
that could begin to shift the conversation in this direction, taking an
individual’s PHI away from the absolute ownership of parents, away
from the parental default in HIPAA, and away from the
informational rights of parents asserted in wrongful birth lawsuits.
Though this reformed regime might look similar and countenance
many of the same disclosures of PHI to parents that already occur in
the current landscape, by reframing the perspective to be one of a
black box mediated by clinicians that stages results and limits PHI
disclosures to parents only to those rooted in the presumed consent
or best interests of the later-born child, such a reformed terrain
would provide a more deliberative, intentional, and concerted
framework for protecting PHI throughout an individual’s lifetime.
In this way, it sets better foundations for personal privacy for the
future.
